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The Special Purpose District Reconsidered: The
Fifth Circuit’s Recent Declaration that the Edwards
Aquifer Authority is a Special Purpose District under
the Voting Rights Act, and the Tortured History that
Led to That Decision
Christopher Brown*
Introduction
This article seeks to use the Voting Rights Act dispute that followed
the creation of the Edwards Aquifer Authority to examine the statute’s
possible consequences for common pool resource governance.
In its 2019 decision, League of United Latin American Citizens
(“LULAC”) v. Edwards Aquifer Authority (“EAA”),1 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the configuration of
the EAA governing board did not violate the one person, one vote principle
of the Voting Rights Act.2 This central Texas authority—which regulates
the quantity of groundwater pumped from one of the nation’s largest
aquifers—consists of three water user regions: agricultural irrigators from
Del Rio to San Antonio, Texas; urban consumers in San Antonio, Texas;
and recreational users, as well as federally protected endangered species in
the spring region from San Antonio to just south of Austin, Texas.3
As this article suggests, under the Equal Protection Clause and the
Voting Rights Act, the one person, one vote principle would appear to
confer on the urban water users of San Antonio a vastly greater number of
*
Christopher Brown is an Associate Professor in the Political Science Department
at Texas State University, where he focuses on legal studies and public administration. He
completed his undergraduate studies at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, and
his graduate work in law and public administration at the University of Texas at Austin.
Before arriving at Texas State University, he served as a judicial clerk in a Texas appellate
court and federal district court, litigated on behalf of the Texas Attorney General’s Office
in federal and state courts, instructed third-year law students in Tulane University Law
School’s environmental law clinic, and worked on surface water environmental flow issues
for the National Wildlife Federation. He is currently completing the requirements for a
Ph.D. in Environmental Geography.
1. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Edwards Aquifer Authority, 313 F.
Supp. 3d 735 (W.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d, League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Edwards Aquifer Authority, 937 F.3d 457, 471–472 (5th Cir. 2019).
2. League of United Latin American Citizens, 937 F.3d at 471–472.
3. Id. at 459–461; see also About the EAA, EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTHORITY,
https://perma.cc/B9B7-L9UZ.
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votes than the irrigation users or the spring users. However, from the
Justice Department’s preclearance of the EAA board under section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act in 1993 until the Fifth Circuit’s 2019 decision in
LULAC, federal authorities have approved a board that apportions roughly
equal representation to each of the three aquifer user groups (irrigators,
urban users, and spring users) rather than basing representation on
population.4
The Fifth Circuit rejected an equal protection challenge to the
Edwards board on the basis that the EAA is a “special purpose district,” a
“unit of local government historically designed to provide an individualized
response to the special problems of a particular locality.”5 One wellaccepted definition of special purpose districts describes them as
“organized governmental units operating outside the realm of general
county government established to perform a single function or
multifunction as authorized by the enabling body creating them.”6
Interestingly, in the 1990s, the Texas legislature and the United States
Justice Department applied principles consistent with the special purpose
district exception but never actually identified the EAA as such.7 This
article analyzes the circuitous process by which the mutually suspicious
users of the Edwards Aquifer struggled to create a board that would protect
their interests while somehow passing the Voting Rights Act’s muster. The
logic they employed to do so was consistent with the special purpose
district, even though the EAA was not identified this way until years later,
in 2019.8
A subsequent article will question whether the EAA actually conforms
to the letter or spirit of the special purpose district exception to the one
person, one vote principle in light of the developments in Edwards
Aquifer’s use over almost thirty years. This article will suggest the possible
damage to constitutional voting rights if the federal courts continue to apply
the special purpose district exception to the EAA if it no longer applies.

4. EAA Timeline, EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTHORITY, https://perma.cc/KGA4-2ACV.
5. Michael Goldsmith, Voting-Priority Qualifications for Voting in Special Purpose
Districts Beyond the Scope of One Man-One Vote, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 687, 692 (1974),
https://perma.cc/9W4T-FMBS.
6. U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, PROFILE OF
COUNTY GOVERNMENT 37 (1972).
7. See EAA Timeline, supra note 4 (The floor debates of S.B. 1477—the enabling
legislation for the Edwards Aquifer Authority—as well as the floor debates of H.B. 3189—
which created the 4-7-4 configuration of the Edwards Aquifer Authority Board—contain
discussions of the need to deviate from One Person, One Vote to protect the less populous
irrigation and spring user regions. Correspondence between the Department of Justice and
Texas water leadership also acknowledged the disparate user groups and population in the
three regions that used the Edwards Aquifer).
8. League of United Latin American Citizens, 937 F.3d at 470–471.
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The Interplay Between Common Pool Resources and Local
Government
Attorney and geographer Rutherford Platt observed that “[t]he
influence of law and politics is ubiquitous as a driver of human interaction
with the natural world.”9 Platt described local governments as the “primary
source of public oversight of land use in the United States”10 and the legal,
political, and geographic characteristics of local governments as
determinants of land use policy.11 In this context, Platt noted the
proliferation of “special districts and regional authorities” to provide
“diverse public services at various geographic scales.”12 Among the special
districts that exercise “primary public oversight of land use,” none plays a
more critical role than those charged with regulating common pool
resources like groundwater. As of 2017, 60 percent of Texas’s total water
demand of 16.1 million acre-feet came from this source.13
A common pool resource benefits individual users in a group, often in
the absence of rules apportioning use to ensure the long-term preservation
of the resource. Without such rules, the default incentive for each
individual user is to maximize his or her individual utility by using as much
of the resource as possible. This individually rational strategy produces a
collectively irrational result: the benefit to everyone diminishes if each
individual pursues his or her own self-interest. The value of a common
pool resource can be reduced through overuse because the supply of the
resource is not unlimited, and using more than can be replenished can result
in scarcity.14 Elinor Ostrom, the famous scholar of common pool resources,
identified grazing meadows, irrigation water, fish populations, and
groundwater as prominent examples of common pool resources.15
This article analyzes the formulation of the governing body of the
Edwards Aquifer Authority. A major common pool resource, the Edwards
Aquifer of south and central Texas is a crescent-shaped, 176-mile-long
body of groundwater that reaches from Del Rio, through San Antonio, to
south Austin, Texas, and serves almost two million people.16 Specifically,
this article analyzes the legal and statutory process in the 1990s by which

9. RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY: GEOGRAPHY, LAW, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 6 (3rd ed. 2014).
10. Id. at 185–186.
11. Id.
12. PLATT, supra note 9, at 185–186.
13. TEXAS WATER DEVELOPMENT BOARD, 2017 STATE WATER PLAN: WATER FOR
TEXAS 63–68 (2017), https://perma.cc/357E-2MQB.
14. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 1–8 (reprint ed. 2015).
15. Id. at 58–178.
16. Darcy Frownfelter, The Edwards Aquifer Authority, in ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS
WATER RESOURCES, 17-3 – 17-7 (Mary Sahs ed., 2016).
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Texas ultimately formulated a governing board for the Edwards Aquifer
Authority that represented the interests of three different aquifer user
groups—irrigators, urban water consumers, and protectors of endangered
springs—and received ultimate approval from the United States
Department of Justice under the now-defunct Preclearance Requirement of
Section Five of the Voting Rights Act.
In order to analyze the legal and political processes that resulted in the
governance of the Edwards, analysts of common pool resource governance
in other contexts prove invaluable. In particular, the work that Elinor
Ostrom did on the governance of common pool resources in general and
groundwater basins provides insights into the characteristics of governing
arrangements that tend to endure for long periods of time.17 Ostrom and
other common pool resource scholars study the circumstances under which
common pool resource users succeed or fail in their efforts to disrupt
default rules of use that exhaust a resource and to replace them with rules
that sustain it.18 Ostrom is unique among these scholars because she
questions the inevitable need for unilateral intervention by a larger
governmental entity—a “Leviathan”—to coerce common pool resource
users to adopt new rules.19 Based on her studies of different common pool
resources, Ostrom did not reject the practical need to appeal to higher
political or legal authorities in the struggle to implement new rules in some
cases, or for higher governmental authorities to play a role in the ongoing
regulation of the resource. Ostrom calls this “polycentric” regulation
(responsibility for governing the common resource may form nested tiers
from the lowest governmental level up to the highest in an interconnected
system).20 However, while she sees no guaranteed formula for success in
common pool resource governance, Ostrom insists that the most successful
governance originates with the users themselves: bottom-up selfgovernment.21
Consistent with this observation, Ostrom also insisted that the
characteristics of long-enduring common pool resource regulation she
observed did not amount to a “formula for success” in other contexts.22 In
the end, each resource was idiosyncratic. Nevertheless, Ostrom clearly
believed that some systems worked better than others, and that the most
successful common pool resource regulation originated with decisionmaking by the local users.23 Consider the eight characteristics of successful
17. OSTROM, supra note 14, at 58–178.
18. See, e.g., Jay Walljasper, Elinor Ostrom’s 8 Principles for Managing A
Commons, ON THE COMMONS (Oct. 2, 2011), https://perma.cc/77BL-YYHG.
19. OSTROM, supra note 14, at 8–12.
20. Id. at 133–136.
21. Walljasper, supra note 18.
22. OSTROM, supra note 14, at 88–90.
23. Id. at 88–101.
6
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common pool resource governance she advanced in Governing the
Commons, six of which depend directly on local users for success (marked
by asterisks):
Define clear group boundaries. *
Match rules governing use of common goods to local needs and
conditions. *
Ensure that those affected by the rules can participate in
modifying the rules. *
Make sure the rule-making rights of community members are
respected by outside authorities.
Develop a system, carried out by community members, for
monitoring members’ behavior. *
Use graduated sanctions for rule violators. *
Provide accessible, low-cost means for dispute resolution. *
Build responsibility for governing the common resource in
nested tiers from the lowest level up to the entire interconnected
system (“polycentric governance”).24
Indeed, the importance Ostrom placed on devising political
boundaries that were coextensive with the natural resource itself
underscores the importance of all concerned users having a place at the
decision-making table.25 Ostrom observed common pool resource
governance in which the users of the resource themselves made the
decisions concerning the issues listed above.26
Still, Ostrom’s rejection of the governmental or judicial Leviathan that
unilaterally imposes usage rules on a common pool resource is more
nuanced than one might expect. In her case histories of California
groundwater basins, for example, she describes those basins with a single
dominant user group that can impose rules on other users as the most
efficient.27 With regard to the eighth factor listed above—”nested
authorities” up a legal and political hierarchy that govern a resource—
Ostrom suggests that a Leviathan may be necessary in the long term, but
the governmental entity formed by the users should devise the rules of use
that higher governmental authorities later enforce.28
Texas groundwater law and regulation exhibit many of the difficulties
Ostrom would predict when her eight characteristics of enduring common
pool resource management are significantly absent. Most obviously,
24. OSTROM, supra note 14, at 88–101.
25. Id. at 88–93.
26. Walljasper, supra note 18.
27. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 14, at 111–132 (Ostrom’s comparison of the
negotiations that led to new rules of use for the Raymond Basin and the Central Basin).
28. Id. at 88–93.
7
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approximately fifty-four counties overlying aquifers in Texas have no
groundwater conservation districts whatsoever, leaving other entities to
generate needed data for the state water planning process and leaving
groundwater almost entirely unregulated.29 These counties operate on what
one might describe as a partially Hobbesian, partially “top-down”
Leviathan approach that the Texas Water Development Board imposes.30
Moreover, with some exceptions, the entire system of local
groundwater districts conforms to county political boundaries.31 Ostrom’s
observation that the boundaries of a successful groundwater district
conform to the boundaries of the natural resource itself goes largely
unheeded. Just one example: a 2011 study by the Bureau of Economic
Geology reported that twenty-one different groundwater districts on the
local level regulated a single major regional aquifer, the Carrizo Wilcox.32
The report suggests that the districts experience ongoing difficulties
arriving at accurate groundwater availability data for their portions of the
aquifer, and that a number of them struggle with over-pumping.33 The
Texas Water Development Board gathers data from the twenty-one districts
to calculate groundwater availability without certainty that the local
numbers are accurate.34
Another general observation exemplifies the way that local
groundwater governance in Texas deviates from Ostrom’s
recommendations. State law provides that the state legislature can form a
groundwater district, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality can
work with the legislature to form a district, or local residents who use the
aquifer can petition to form one.35 A minority of groundwater districts have
come into existence through action by local residents.36
The Edwards Aquifer Authority is unique in Texas’s local
groundwater regulation. The Authority’s boundaries largely follow the
configuration of the aquifer itself, excluding a farther north segment
separated geologically and by user groups.37 The Edwards experienced the
29. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), Texas Groundwater
Conservation Districts, https://perma.cc/8TG6-8524.
30. See, e.g., TEXAS WATER DEVELOPMENT BOARD, supra note 13, at 65–68.
31. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), supra note 29.
32. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC GEOLOGY, CARRIZO-WILCOX AQUIFER STUDY, 93–135
(2011), https://perma.cc/E98B-53TB.
33. Id. at 221–225.
34. Id.
35. Michael Booth, Trey Nesloney & Deborah Trejo, Chapter 36: Groundwater
Conservation Districts and Subsidence Districts, in ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS WATER
RESOURCES 16-2 – 16-6 (Mary Sahs, 5th ed. 2019).
36. Id.
37. Ian C. Jones, Texas Water Dev. Bd., Defining Groundwater Flow Characteristics
in the Northern Segment of the Edwards Aquifer Based on Groundwater Chemistry, 2
AUSTIN GEOLOGICAL SOC’Y BULLETIN 54 (2006), https://perma.cc/K9MC-SXM2.
8
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rough trajectory Ostrom described in the groundwater basins in southern
California: Hobbesian rules of use that led to over-pumping, followed by
litigation that led to a court order requiring decreased pumping, followed
by negotiation and mutual agreements to reduce pumping that the court
incorporated into an order and judgment.38 However, in the case of the
Edwards, the lawsuit that served as the triggering event to produce new
negotiated rules of use was different than in Ostrom’s examples: the Sierra
Club filed a citizen suit under the Endangered Species Act to maintain
adequate spring flows at Comal and San Marcos Springs to help ensure the
survival of listed plant and animal species.39 The negotiating process to
create new rules acknowledged the interests of three user groups:
agricultural (Del Rio to Bexar County), urban (Bexar County), and spring
users (Comal to southern Travis County).40
The issue of how distinct aquifer user groups would be represented in
a new governing body for a common pool resource formed a critical chapter
in the history of the Edwards. This raises an interesting issue with regard
to Ostrom’s writings. She recognized the necessity of “polycentric
governance” for many of the common pool resources she studied but left
ambiguous the role that a panoply of state and federal laws would have on
the formulation of common pool resource governance.41 One such law is
the federal Voting Rights Act.
In her account of California groundwater interests throughout the state
that worked with state legislators to formulate legislation, Ostrom uses the
term “pumpers.”42 This could mean landowners with the right to pump
groundwater from under their land, or it could mean private or public water
supply companies that pump groundwater for consumers. Elsewhere,
Ostrom refers to groundwater “users.”43 This could mean “appropriators”
who secure groundwater for uses physically removed from the overlying

38. OSTROM, supra note 14, at 104–126.
39. Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO-91-CA-069, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 151353 (W.D.
Tex. Feb. 1, 1993), appeal dismissed sub nom. Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 995 F.2d 571 (5th
Cir. 1993).
40. Todd H. Votteler, Raiders of the Lost Aquifer? Or, the Beginning of the End to
Fifty Years of Conflict over the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 284 (2004),
https://perma.cc/368A-2UEY; The EAA: A Success Story, EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTHORITY,
https://perma.cc/UF64-NXSH.
41. OSTROM, supra note 14, at 133–142; see also, Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets
and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems, 100 AM. ECON. REV.
641, 641–672 (2010).
42. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 14, at 124 (“In Raymond Basin, the number of
pumpers was relatively small, and one participant—the City of Pasadena—was more
dominant than was any participant in West Basin or Central Basin”); see also OSTROM,
supra note 14, at 125.
43. See OSTROM, supra note 14, at 106, 124–126 (for “use”, “users”, and descriptions
of consumers as opposed to “pumpers”).
9
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land, or retail consumers who purchase water from an “appropriator” water
company. With regard to any of the groundwater districts Ostrom
documented, the scope of the franchise and the weight of representation
afforded to user groups remain open questions without detailed inquiry
within the boundaries of her book.44
No doubt Ostrom would have delineated the groundwater user
categories she meant by each of these terms based on her research. In
Governing the Commons, however, she did not describe how groundwater
district inhabitants would be afforded the right to vote. What weight did
each voter have? Did the districts formulate their voting systems based on
the type of issue being decided? Ostrom recognized the courts and the
hierarchy of political entities that could make critical decisions in
governing groundwater.45 Aside from California groundwater law,
governing codes of groundwater basins, and groundwater-related statutes
at the state level, however, Ostrom did not appear to give as much thought
to laws like the Voting Rights Act that could affect the creation of a
groundwater district and the formulation of its governing board.
Without question, the Voting Rights Act continues to play an
important role in determining the governance of groundwater districts, even
after the United States Supreme Court eviscerated the Preclearance Process
under Section 5 of the statute: as recently as 2018–2019, the EAA
governing board faced a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in League
of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Edwards Aquifer Authority
(EAA).46
By analyzing the history of the Voting Rights Act dispute over the
governance of the Edwards Aquifer Authority, this article seeks to analyze
a dimension of common pool resource regulation that remains an open
question in Ostrom’s Governing the Commons.
The Edwards Aquifer, Its Diverse Users, and Efforts to Govern It
Before the Edwards Aquifer Authority
The Edwards Aquifer’s Nature, Importance, and Limitations
In order to understand the controversy over the regulation of the
Edwards Aquifer, some information about the aquifer and its users as of the
early 1990s is necessary.

44. See OSTROM, supra note 14, at 103–181.
45. Id. at 123–142 (for the role of courts and local groundwater districts in arriving
at sustainable rules of aquifer use).
46. League of United Latin American Citizens, 937 F.3d at 471–472.
10
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As already described, the Edwards Aquifer stretches 176 miles in a
crescent shape, covering approximately 3,600 square miles in six counties,
starting just east of the Del Rio city limits, stretching across San Antonio,
through New Braunfels, and ending north of San Marcos around Kyle,
Texas.47 The Edwards ranges in width from five to thirty miles and consists
of a “[b]elt of porous, water-bearing, primarily carbonate rocks in the
Balcones Fault Zone.”48 The Edwards sustains approximately forty aquatic
species, nine cave-dwelling species, seven federally listed endangered
species, and one federally listed threatened species.49 The limestone that
comprises the Edwards Aquifer recharges quickly in response to
precipitation but also loses water quickly in its absence.50 Recharge of the
Edwards is highly variable, ranging from 46,000 to two million acre-feet
per year.51 Water in the Edwards flows from west to east, then northeast,
and it discharges naturally at springs, especially Comal Springs at New
Braunfels and San Marcos Springs in San Marcos, Texas.52
The underground formation generally falls in elevation from west to
east. The formation also generally dips toward the Gulf of Mexico. The
water level in the Edwards generally decreases from the west to the east.
Most of the water in the Edwards comes from the flows of surface streams
located in the upper portion of the Nueces River Basin, the upper portion
of the San Antonio River basin, and part of the upper portion of the
Guadalupe River Basin, collectively called the contributory watershed.53
The above-described recharge area bounds the aquifer to the north; the
so called “bad water line” bounds the aquifer to the south. The bad water
line consists of a region where the water moves at rates of flow considered
insignificant compared to the remainder of the aquifer, and which separates
water containing less than on thousand milligrams per liter of total
dissolved solids (“TDS”) from water containing more than one thousand
milligrams per liter of TDS.54 Water along and south of the bad water line
contains much higher concentrations of minerals and hydrogen sulfide.55

47. U.S. Geological Survey, Edwards Aquifer Study in Texas, (last visited Mar. 14,
2020, 10:00 PM) https://perma.cc/5FMK-V76S.
48. U.S. Geological Survey, supra note 47.
49. Gregg Eckhardt, Endangered Species of the Edwards Aquifer, THE EDWARDS
AQUIFER WEBSITE, (last visited Mar. 14, 2020, 10:00 PM) https://perma.cc/6ERS-JTGX.
50. U.S. Geological Survey, New Insights into the Edwards Aquifer: Brackish Water,
Simulation Drought, and the Role of Uncertainty Analysis, (Feb. 2016)
https://perma.cc/WPX7-NYUT.
51. Sierra Club, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 151353 at 6.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 4.
55. Texas Regulates the Edwards Aquifer, 7 WATER STRATEGIST, 1–2, 7, 11–12 (Jul.
1993).
11
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Although the aquifer itself lies below six Texas counties, a total of
nine counties use Edwards water in some capacity: Atascosa, Bexar,
Caldwell, Frio, Guadalupe, (a small segment of) Kinney, Medina, Uvalde,
and Wilson Counties.56 Aquifer water flows from west to east and then
north-northeast, placing Uvalde and Medina Counties “upstream” and
Comal and Hays Counties “downstream.” In the western counties, the
Edwards Aquifer supplies irrigation for corn and cotton crops; cheap
Edwards Aquifer water is critical to keeping the cost of production low and
retaining already slim profit margins.57 In the northeastern counties, the
Edwards supports the largest springs in Texas at New Braunfels and San
Marcos.58 These springs, in turn, feed the Guadalupe River. The
Guadalupe relies on the aquifer for 30 percent of its flow during normal
rainfall years and up to 70 percent of its flow during drought conditions.59
Comal and Hays Counties rely on the springs for recreation, tourism, and
academic study.60 The springs support populations of flora and fauna in
danger of extinction.61 Support of these two spring systems requires
approximately 350,000 acre-feet (af) per year, over one-half of the annual
637,000 af/year total aquifer recharge.62 One acre-foot is the amount of
water necessary to cover one acre of land with one foot of water; one acrefoot equals 325,851 gallons.63
As of the early 1990s, when the Edwards litigation occurred, the
Edwards Aquifer was the sole source of water for approximately 1.5 million
people, including the inhabitants of San Antonio, and was designated as the
sole source aquifer for the region under the Safe Drinking Water Act.64 In
the 1990s, the Edwards supported approximately 700,000 to 800,000 jobs
and cumulative annual incomes of approximately $13 to $15 billion.65 Six
downstream river basins rely on the flow of the aquifer for their existence,
which in turn provide water for residents all the way to the Gulf of
Mexico.66 The Guadalupe River basin alone, which relies on the Edwards
Aquifer for approximately 21–32 percent of its annual flow, contained
approximately 80,000 residents in the 1990s.67

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
12
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Id. at 5, 26.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 14, 19–21.
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Id.
42 U.S.C. § 300(f) – (g) (2016).
Sierra Club, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 151353 at 14.
Id.
Texas Regulates the Edwards Aquifer, supra note 55.
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In the 1950s, peak-to-trough fluctuations in the water level varied an
average of three feet; that same variation now stands at thirty feet each
year.68 Another indication of the excessive demands being placed on the
Edwards can be measured by Comal and San Marcos springs’ flow as a
percentage of total recharge. From 1934 until the 1990s, spring flows fell
from about 50 percent of total recharge to below 20 percent.69 Recharge of
the aquifer from rainfall and from surface streams is highly variable,
ranging from 46,000 to two million af/year.70 Because the aquifer both
recharges and loses water quickly, the rate of recharge varies widely from
year to year, while demand steadily increases.71 The total annual demand
on the aquifer totaled approximately 30,000 af/year at the turn of the
century; the annual demand in the 1980s reached an average of 500,000
af/year.72 The annual demand in the mid-1990s reached approximately
540,000 af.73 In the 1990s, demands on the Edwards Aquifer already
exceeded the aquifer’s known firm capacity during dry years, which led to
over-drafting, or “mining.”74 The consequences of mining included the
possible destruction of already-endangered species and of the water supply
itself.75
The 500,000–540,000 af/year range of use threatened to dry up the
springs in Comal and Hays Counties in 1984, 1989, and 1990.76 Given the
condition of the worst drought of the century, aquifer water use would have
to be reduced to approximately 200,000 af/year to preserve the springs at a
level sufficient to ensure the survival of the endangered species that live
there.77
Over-drafting also allows the intrusion of highly mineralized water
from underground water adjacent to the aquifer, otherwise held in check by
the hydrostatic pressure exerted by the aquifer. Such “bad water” has been
discovered underlying the San Marcos Springs itself.78 A decrease in the
volume of water also decreases the aquifer’s capacity to assimilate effluent
and other forms of pollution.79 If spring flows fall below certain levels, the
springs are dominated by return flows from municipal and industrial

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Sierra Club, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 151353 at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. .
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 7–8.
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discharges, along with contaminated runoff from adjacent agricultural and
urban areas.80
Although the Edwards water supply did not reach critical levels of
shortage until the 1980s and 1990s, users of the Edwards Aquifer have seen
harbingers of a possible water shortage for decades. In the 1950s, Central
and South Texas experienced the most severe drought of the century to
date.81 Even at the levels of aquifer usage reached in the 1950s, levels in
the Edwards reached such a low that San Antonio sought alternative water
supplies, such as Canyon Lake, which was being constructed at that time.82
San Antonio had undertaken intermittent efforts to regulate the aquifer and
create alternative water supplies since the city failed to obtain water rights
to Canyon Lake during the 1950s.83 However, San Antonio did not resume
full-scale efforts to locate other sources of water until the 1980s.84
Attempts to regulate aquifer usage during the 1950s drought failed as
well because there was no state agency empowered to regulate pumpage,
and because Texas adhered to the common law rule of capture, discussed
in a subsequent section. Between 1988 and 1990, use of water from the
Edwards Aquifer exceeded recharge 47 percent of the time.85 In July 1990,
the Texas Water Development Board predicted that on the basis of thencurrent trends, water use would reach more than 700,000 af/year by 2030,
and yields in excess of levels that would ensure the flow of the Comal and
San Marcos springs had already been reached.86
The Edwards Aquifer’s Diverse Users as of the 1990s
Information from the 1990s concerning the populations of the nine
counties that use the aquifer, along with the quantity and quality of their
water use, is critical to understanding the dispute over the regulation of the
Edwards. The following information was derived from 1990 census87 data,

80.
81.

Sierra Club, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 151353 at 7–8.
ROBERT GULLEY, HEADS ABOVE WATER: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE EDWARDS
AQUIFER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM 3 (2015), https://perma.cc/W9UQ-HQNL.
82. GULLEY, supra note 81, at 6–14.
83. Donovan Burton, San Presentation on the Antonio Water System, Texas State
University (Spring 2019).
84. GULLEY, supra note 81, at 11–19.
85. Edwards Underground Water District, Compilation Of Hydrologic Data For The
Edwards Aquifer, San Antonio Area, Texas, 1990, With 1934-90 Summary, (Dec. 1991)
https://perma.cc/6V4E-U4VQ.
86. Texas Water Development Board, Changes in Groundwater Conditions in the
Edwards and Trinity Aquifers: 1987-1997, (1999) https://perma.cc/ZN5F-SU8U.
87. U.S. Census Bureau (Apr. 1, 1990), https://perma.cc/4387-6ZLD.
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as well as water usage data compiled by the erstwhile Edwards
Underground Water District and the Guadalupe Blanco River Authority:88
(1) Atascosa County
(a) 30,533 total inhabitants. App. 69% of this population was
of voting age, or approximately 21,068 persons.
(b) 46.5% of the population was white and non-Hispanic.
(c) 52.6% was of any Hispanic origin; 48% was MexicanAmerican.
(d) 0.5% was African-American.
(2) Bexar County
(a) 1,185,394 total inhabitants. 70.8% of this population was
of voting age, or approximately 839,259 persons.
(b) 41.9% of the total population was non-Hispanic and
white.
(c) 49.9% was Hispanic of any origin; 45.5% was MexicanAmerican.
(d) 7.1% was African-American.
(3) Caldwell County
(a) 26,392 total inhabitants. App. 70% of this population was
of voting age, or approximately 18,475 persons.
(b) 51.3% of the population was white and non-Hispanic.
(c) 37.8% was of any Hispanic origin; 35.4% was MexicanAmerican.
(d) 10.7% was African-American.
(4) Comal County
(a) 51,832 total inhabitants. App. 74.2% of this population
was of voting age, or approximately 38,460 persons.
(b) 75.7% of the population was white and non-Hispanic.
(c) 22.9% was of any Hispanic origin; 21.3% was MexicanAmerican.
(d) 0.9% was African-American.
(5) Guadalupe County
(a) 64,873 total inhabitants. App. 70% of this population was
of voting age, or approximately 45,411 persons.
(b) 63.9% of the population was white and non-Hispanic.
(c) 29.7% was of any Hispanic origin; 27.2% was MexicanAmerican.
(d) 5.6% was African-American.
88. Edwards Underground Water District, Report of the Technical Data Review
Panel on the Water Resources of the South Central Texas Region, (Nov. 18, 1992),
https://perma.cc/V9YC-V3MN; Hicks & Company, Regulatory Impact Assessment for
Proposed Implementation Rules, GUADALUPE-BLANCO RIVER AUTH. 18–19, 43–45 (Aug.
2004), https://perma.cc/GX96-LPGT.
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(6) Hays County
(a) 65,832 total inhabitants. App. 75.6% of this population
was of voting age, or approximately 49,769 persons.
(b) 68.1% of the population was white and non-Hispanic.
(c) 27.8% was of any Hispanic origin; 25.7% was MexicanAmerican.
(d) 3.4% was African-American.
(7) Kinney County
(a) 3,119 total inhabitants. App. 74.9% of this population
was of voting age, or approximately 2336 persons.
(b) 46.9% of the population was white and non-Hispanic.
(c) 50.3% was of Hispanic origin; 49.9% was MexicanAmerican.
(d) 1.8% was African-American.
(8) Medina County
(a) 27,312 total inhabitants. App. 70.3% of this population
was of voting age, or approximately 19,200 persons.
(b) 54.7% of the population was white and non-Hispanic.
(c) 44.4% was of any Hispanic origin; 41.1% was MexicanAmerican.
(d) 0.5% was African-American.
(9) Uvalde County
(a) 23,340 total inhabitants. App. 71% of this population was
of voting age, or approximately 16,571 persons.
(b) 38.7% of the population was white and non-Hispanic.
(c) 60.4% was of any Hispanic origin; 56.9% was MexicanAmerican.
(d) 0.2% was African-American.
In addition to the above information about the nature of the inhabitants
who would comprise the Edwards Aquifer Authority’s electorate in its early
years, these counties’ water use patterns during the period are also basic to
understanding the issues involved in regulating the Edwards Aquifer. The
United States Geological Survey provides the water districts in the Edwards
region with estimated rates of pumpage on a county-by-county basis and
according to the uses of the water in each county.89 These data provide
concrete indications of the disparate interests at play in the controversies
surrounding the Edwards.
The USGS in San Antonio, Texas, explained that only five of the nine
counties listed above pump water from the Edwards in a measurable

89. D.S. Brown & J.T. Patton, Recharge to and Discharge from the Edwards Aquifer
in the San Antonio Area, Texas, 1995, OPEN-FILE REPORT 96–181 (1996) https://
perma.cc/4EAD-ATZW.
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quantity: Uvalde, Bexar, Comal, Hays, and Medina.90 The other four
counties are found over regions of the aquifer that contain largely brackish
water and therefore rely on aquifer water pumped from the above five
counties.91 These four dependent or vicarious counties are Atascosa (reliant
on aquifer water from Medina County), Kinney (reliant on aquifer water
from Uvalde County), Guadalupe, and Caldwell Counties.92 Guadalupe
and Caldwell obtain aquifer water piped from various sources, largely Hays
and Comal Counties, and also have an interest in the aquifer because
surface waters on which these counties rely are fed by the Edwards.93
The 1995 USGS statistics for the five counties that pump from the
Edwards are as follows. Note that total discharge includes both pumped
water and water that emerges from springs; limits on aquifer pumpage
discussed in subsequent chapters do not include the percentage of water
that emerges from springs such as Comal and San Marcos, for example.94
(A) Bexar County
(1) Total 1995 discharge: 272,100 acre-feet (af)
(2) Average daily usages in millions of gallons:
(a) 4.6 million gallons/day in spring flow.
(b) 204.2 million gallons/day in municipal uses.
(c) 19.9 million gallons/day in industrial uses.
(d) 7.4 million gallons/day in irrigation.
(e) 6.8 million gallons/day to water livestock.
(B) Comal County
(1) Total 1995 discharge: 325,000 af.
(2) Average daily usages in millions of gallons:
(a) 194.7 million gallons/day in spring flow.
(b) 3 million gallons/day in municipal uses.
(c) 11.8 million gallons/day in industrial uses.
(d) 0.2 million, or 200,000, gallons/day in irrigation.
(e) 0.2 million, or 200,000, gallons/day to water livestock.
(C)Hays County
(l) Total 1995 discharge: 127,800 acre-feet.
(2) Average daily usages in millions of gallons:
(a) 102 million gallons/day in spring flow.
(b) 10.2 million gallons/day in municipal uses.
(c) 1.3 million gallons/day in industrial uses.
90. U.S. Geological Survey, The Edwards Aquifer Authority and U.S. Geological
Survey Water Resources Program Quarterly Report—04/01/2000 to 07/31/2000, https://
perma.cc/6X4H-EEHM.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. D.S. Brown, supra note 89, at 96–181.
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(d) 0.1 million, or 100,000, gallons/day in irrigation.
(e) 0.5 million, or 500,000, gallons/day to water livestock.
(D) Medina (plus Atascosa) Counties
(l) Total 1995 discharge: 44,000 acre-feet.
(2) Average daily usages in millions of gallons:
(a) no spring flow.
(b) 5.2 million gallons/day in municipal uses.
(c) no industrial uses.
(d) 25.5 million gallons/day in irrigation.
(e) 0.7 million, or 700,000, gallons/day to water livestock.
(E) Uvalde (plus Kinney) Counties
(1) Total 1995 discharge: 908,000 af.
(2) Average daily usages in millions of gallons:
(a) 21.3 million gallons in spring flow.
(b) 4.2 million gallons/day in municipal uses.
(c) 0.4 million, or 400,000, gallons/day in industrial uses.
(d) 51.7 million gallons/day in irrigation.
(e) 1.3 million gallons/day to water domestic livestock.
From these numbers, it is possible to construct three broad water use
regions. The northeastern region, consisting of Hays, Comal, and portions
of Caldwell and Guadalupe Counties, can be described as the “spring user”
region (Comal and Hayes Counties had a combined spring flow level of
296.7 million gallons per day in 1995). The central region, consisting of
Bexar County, can be described as the “municipal user” region (Bexar
County pumped 204.2 million gallons per day for municipal use in 1995).
The southwestern region, consisting of Medina, Uvalde, and portions of
Atascosa and Kinney Counties, together comprise the “irrigation user”
region (Medina and Uvalde Counties together pumped 77.2 million gallons
per day for irrigation in 1995). Only Bexar County was large enough in the
1990s to count municipal use as its primary use.95
When one compares the populations of these three regions in the
1990s with their respective water use levels, the smaller counties’ desire
for representation to be apportioned according to different water uses,
rather than according to population, becomes clear. Bexar County’s
population exceeded the combined populations of the spring user and
irrigation use counties: 1,185,394 in Bexar County compared with 293,233
in all eight other counties.96

95. Edwards Underground Water District, supra note 88, at 11; see also Edwards
Aquifer Authority, Groundwater Management Plan 1998-2008, 17–19 (Aug. 1998), https://
perma.cc/T2R7-B8Q2.
96. Edwards Underground Water District, supra note 88, at 11; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(Apr. 1, 1990), https://perma.cc/4387-6ZLD.
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The contrast in the ratio of inhabitants to acre-feet of water used each
year is equally striking. The ratio of water usage (spring flow and pumpage
combined) to inhabitants in Comal County was 6.27 af/year per person. In
Bexar County, the same ratio was 0.229 af/year per person. The amount of
water in Comal County per capita was approximately twenty-four times
more than in Bexar. In Medina and Atascosa Counties combined, the same
ratio was 1.32 af/year per person: approximately five times the amount of
water per person in Bexar County. These statistics not only demonstrate
that the irrigator and spring counties would prefer a system of
representation based on the different water uses rather than on population.
Additionally, the water use to inhabitant ratios demonstrate that
representatives from the irrigation- and spring-user counties, once elected
to an aquifer authority, would be motivated to reject water allocation plans
tied to population.
The spring user region faced a unique problem: the ratio of aquifer
water pumped per unit of population was quite small, but the economy of
the spring user region was nevertheless dependent on maintaining the
uninterrupted flow of water that naturally discharged from Comal and San
Marcos Springs.97 The economic activities of both the irrigation-and
spring-user counties relied on water in ways that the size of their
populations did not reflect.
From the population and water-use patterns above, one can also
correlate the three regions with the attitudes and legal strategies their
inhabitants have used to maximize their respective control over aquifer
water. In terms of the respective regions’ attitudes toward aquifer
regulation, the above-listed population and pumpage statistics make clear
why both the spring user and irrigation user regions would view Bexar
County as the greatest threat to the aquifer, and why in a prisoners’
dilemma–type situation both of these regions would refuse to act without
concrete indications that Bexar County had acted first. Further, the
pumpage levels per person in the irrigation user region help to indicate why
the spring user region would also seek regulation over the irrigators.
Consistent with the behavior predicted by the prisoners’ dilemma, the
irrigation user region traditionally refused any pumpage limitations
whatsoever from outside their own underground water districts, arguing
that San Antonio was the biggest user and should therefore bear the entire
brunt of cutbacks.98
From the perspective of the spring user region, which had developed
extensive surface sources of water such as Canyon Lake, both the irrigation
region counties and Bexar County were responsible for the threatened

97.
98.

Edwards Underground Water District, supra note 88, at 18.
GULLEY, supra note 81, at 13–19, 6–14, 23–36, 53 (2015).
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destruction of the Comal and San Marcos springs, as well as the Guadalupe
River.
The three regions’ respective legal strategies in the 1980s and 1990s
were consistent with these attitudes. The spring region, led by the
Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority, was instrumental in each phase of the
Sierra Club litigation. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) offered the
spring region a means of gaining control over the aquifer dispute. Since
the springs upon which this region’s economy so heavily relied were also
home to the endangered species in question, the ESA created an
independent, federal policy justification for regulating aquifer use in a way
that benefited this region with a comparatively small population and a huge
water use–to-inhabitant ratio (in terms of total discharge, not total
pumpage).
Inhabitants of the urban region—Bexar County—pursued varied legal
strategies. Before the endangered species dispute over the Edwards, the
City of San Antonio’s water leadership sought to provide the other two user
regions with assurances that the city would voluntarily reduce its
dependence on the aquifer.99 These assurances proved difficult to make
given the ignorance of, and hostility toward, aquifer regulation among
many San Antonio residents, coupled with the continued absence of a
surface water supply for the city.
After the Endangered Species Act litigation necessitated new aquifer
regulation, City of San Antonio water officials tried to expedite whatever
plan they thought would gain the approval of Lucius Bunton, the federal
judge who presided over the ESA litigation, and his water monitor, Joe
Moore.100
San Antonio leaders hoped for a settlement based on water usage
cutbacks without respect to the configuration of the board being considered
or whether the board was elected or appointed.101 City water officials were
willing to forego advantages conferred by the Voting Rights Act in order
to avoid the economic consequences of federal control of the aquifer.102
Other representatives from San Antonio, along with the Mexican American
Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) and the League of United
Latin American Citizens (LULAC), fought hard for the application of the
one person, one vote principle and the creation of single-member districts
for the new authority.103 The Edwards Underground Water District
(EUWD) board had just been reconfigured to better represent Bexar
County’s population and ethnic composition when consideration of the

99. GULLEY, supra note 81, at 5–43.
100. Id. at 43–69.
101. Id. at 49–69.
102. Id. at 59–95.
103. Id. at 57–69.
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Edwards Aquifer Authority began, and the San Antonians involved in the
EUWD litigation did not intend to lose ground: The Department of Justice
and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ultimately
accepted LULAC’s argument that replacing the elected EUWD board with
an appointed EAA board violated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.104
Finally, other San Antonians engaged in obstructionist and delaying
tactics, arguing alternately that a new authority would violate their property
rights, that the EUWD along with other local districts ought to retain
control over the aquifer through an “interlocal board,” and that changes in
Supreme Court precedent and in the text of the ESA itself might make the
judge’s order in Sierra Club unenforceable.105
Inhabitants of the irrigation region, with a small population and high
ratio of population to water use, feared the prospect of decisions made by a
regional aquifer board dominated by Bexar County.106 The irrigation
region argued for equal representation for each of the three regions
according to type of use.107 Although the irrigation region was split among
livestock raisers, dry land farmers, and irrigators, irrigators had a
disproportionately strong voice. As will be discussed infra, H.R. 3189 gave
Bexar County greater representation than either of the other two regions.
After this legislation passed, the underground water districts in Medina and
Uvalde Counties sued along with irrigators in state court to invalidate the
aquifer authority on the basis that the board’s powers would violate
property rights to groundwater under the rule of capture.108

104. Texas v. U.S, 866 F. Supp. 20, 26–27 (D.D.C. 1994) (concluding that Texas
failed to meet the Section 5 requirement that S.B. 1477 did “not have the purpose and
[would] not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color or” membership in a language minority group (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(c), 1973b(f)))
(current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2020)); see also Letter from James P. Turner, Acting
Assistant Att’y Gen., C.R. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Hon. Jon Hannah, Jr., Texas Sec’y
of State (Nov. 19, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Turner Letter November 19, 1993]
(denying Texas Preclearance under Section 5 of Voting Rights Act for EAA appointed board
created by S.B. 1477).
105. Robert Huddleston, Water Battles of 1990s Shaped Water Policy Today, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, (Jan. 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/AZ9Y-747H; GULLEY, supra
note 81, at 20–69.
106. GULLEY, supra note 81, at 16–17, 23, 51.
107. Id. at 52.
108. See generally Todd H. Votteler, Raiders of the Lost Aquifer? Or, the Beginning
of the End to Fifty Years of Conflict over the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
284 (2004).
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Historic Efforts in Texas to Regulate Groundwater and the
Edwards Aquifer
The Rule of Capture
The common law rule of capture, or “English rule,” forms the legal
context in which the controversy over the regulation of water drawn from
the Edwards Aquifer takes place. Texas stands alone among southwestern
and western states in retaining this common law rule, which originated in
regions (including parts of east Texas) with abundant rainfall, before
scientific knowledge concerning aquifers developed, and in the absence of
modern population pressures.109
In brief, the rule of capture draws a qualitative distinction between
groundwater and surface water, relying on the fiction that surface and
groundwater are independent of one another.110 Whereas water in a surface
stream of sufficient dimension belongs to the people of Texas, and the
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC, now the
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, or TCEQ) regulates its use
through a prior appropriation-based permitting system, a landowner is
deemed to own any “percolating” water under his or her property and is
free to withdraw it at will, without regard to depletion of groundwater
underneath adjoining land, as long as he or she uses the water beneficially,
does not cause land to subside, and does not intentionally waste the
water.111
The basis for absolute groundwater ownership traces to the 1843
decision Acton v. Blundell, which “is founded on the idea that a landowner
should have dominion over the percolating ground water in the same way
he has dominion over other constituents in the subsoil.”112
The Texas Supreme Court adopted the English common-law rule in
1904 in Houston & Texas Central Railway Co. v. East, in which the
Houston & Texas Central Railway Company withdrew water from its land
and used it off premises to maintain its trains, which dried its neighbor’s
wells, including that of East, who argued that a landowner’s right was

109. Ronald Kaiser, Who Owns the Water: A Primer on Texas Groundwater Law
and Spring Flow: The Rule of Capture and Texas Groundwater, TEXAS PARKS AND
WILDLIFE, THE STATE OF TEXAS WATER, https://perma.cc/7E8V-QPYV.
110. Russell S. Johnson, Groundwater Law and Regulation, in ESSENTIALS OF
TEXAS WATER RESOURCES, 4-1 – 4-5, (Mary K. Sahs eds., 2d ed. 2012).
111. Johnson, supra note 110, at 4-4 – 4-6.
112. Ronald Kaiser & Frank F. Skillern, Deep Trouble: Options for Managing the
Hidden Threat of Aquifer Depletion in Texas, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV. 249, 263 (2001)
(discussing Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223).
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“correlative” or limited by a “doctrine of reasonable use.”113 Second, East
argued that the groundwater had to be used on the overlying lands.114
The Texas Supreme Court rejected East’s arguments and held that a
landowner has the exclusive right to water beneath his soil. The Court
adopted a tort-based rule with regard to groundwater: damnum abs que
injuria, which means over-pumping is a loss which does not give rise to an
action for damages.115
The Texas rule of capture is a perfect codification of the Hobbesian
rule of use. Compared to the “correlative rights” and “beneficial use” legal
doctrines that applied to the groundwater Ostrom studied in California,116
the default groundwater law in Texas presents a far more daunting obstacle
to implementing new rules of use to prevent an aquifer’s exhaustion. One
simple indication of this unfortunate reality: Ostrom’s basin users were able
to sue one another for over-pumping.117 In Texas, no such legal catalyst
existed to change the rules of use. The coincidence that federally protected
endangered species inhabited Edwards-fed springs provided a legal deus ex
machina that disrupted Hobbesian use of the Edwards Aquifer. To this day,
a limited range of restrictions on groundwater exists in Texas: subsidence
prevention, Edwards rules that protect federally listed species, and
groundwater district rules that restrict pumping through mechanisms like
well monitoring and spacing in order to achieve desired future conditions
comprise the only restrictions on groundwater pumping in Texas.118
Pre-EAA Legal History of Edwards Regulation
In 1959, the Texas Legislature placed the Edwards under the
jurisdiction of the Edwards Underground Water District (EUWD).119 The
EUWD’s enabling legislation made it responsible for Edwards recharge,
pollution prevention, and water supply and drought planning.120
The EUWD remained subject to the rule of capture: Users were free
to pump as much groundwater as they could without liability to third
parties.121 Downstream surface water rights holders, groundwater pumpers,

113. Houston & T.C. Ry. Co., 81 S.W. at 280–282.
114. Id. at 280-82.
115. Id.
116. OSTROM, supra note 14, at 107–08.
117. Id. at 106–25.
118. Johnson, supra note 110, at 4-13 – 4-19.
119. Texas Water Commission, An Inventory of Water Commission Edwards Aquifer
Correspondence at the Texas State Archives, 1970-1991, undated, bulk 1973-1988, TEXAS
STATE LIBRARY AND ARCHIVE COMMISSION, https://perma.cc/EY9G-Z6LJ.
120. Trace-Etienne Gray, Edwards Underground Water District, TSHA: TEXAS
STATE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, https://perma.cc/6538-TB5T.
121. See Houston & T.C. Ry. Co., 81 S.W. at 281.
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and spring users in the Guadalupe River Basin were all concerned that the
EUWD lacked any legal authority to limit the rule of capture: Spring flows
at Comal Springs and San Marcos Springs continued to diminish, for
example.122 By 1966, a Texas court of appeals concluded that overpumping from the Edwards in San Antonio eliminated reliable flows in the
Guadalupe River downstream.123
In 1989, surface water rightsholders downstream of San Antonio
worked with the Guadalupe Blanco River Authority (GBRA) to bring a suit
arguing that the Edwards was actually an underground river and therefore
the property of the people of Texas and subject to prior appropriation
permitting.124 In 1992, the TNRCC (now the TCEQ) produced a study and
emergency administrative rulemaking to declare the Edwards an
underground river.125 Both the GBRA-led litigation and the state-led
rulemaking to recharacterize the Edwards from “percolating groundwater”
to an “underground river” failed in the courts.126
After the underground river efforts failed, environmental
organizations recognized that they held interests in common with the
residents in the spring user region who sought to prevent the exhaustion of
the Comal and San Marcos Springs through excess groundwater pumping
that the EUWD could not prevent.127 With strong support from the GBRA
and leadership in San Marcos and New Braunfels, the Sierra Club filed
federal suit so that Edwards withdrawals would be regulated for the benefit
of threatened and endangered species dependent on discharges from Comal
and San Marcos Springs.128
Sierra Club v. Lujan: A Perfunctory Account
As suggested at the outset, this article chiefly seeks to use the Voting
Rights Act dispute that followed the creation of the Edwards Aquifer

122. See Sierra Club, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 151353.
123. City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Commission, 392 S.W.2d 200, 210 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1965), aff’d, 407 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1966) (finding that the dependability of the
natural flows of the Guadalupe River had been destroyed due to increased pumping in the
San Antonio region causing decreased spring flows); see also Pecos County Water Control
& Improvement District No. 1 v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. Civ. App 1954, writ
ref’d n.r.e.) (stating that surface water users downstream of spring discharges have no cause
of action against upgradient pumpers for diminishment of spring flows due to groundwater
withdrawals alleged to have caused the reduced spring flows).
124. FROWNFELTER, supra note 16, at 17-3 – 17-7.
125. Id.
126. Guadalupe Blanco River Authority v. Royal Crest Homes, No. 89-0381 (22nd
Dist. Ct., Hays County, Tex., filed Jun. 15, 1989); McFadin v. Texas Water Commission,
No. 92-05214 (331st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., 1992, appeal dismissed by agreement).
127. GULLEY, supra note 81, at 27–42.
128. See Sierra Club, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 151353.
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Authority to examine the statute’s possible consequences for common pool
resource governance. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) controversy that
catalyzed the Texas Legislature’s creation of the Authority after Sierra
Club v. Lujan was decided in federal district court and involved an intricate
set of issues that focused on preserving habitat under Section 4 and
preventing takes of endangered species under Section 9 of the ESA.129
Simply put, the court ordered Texas to create legal mechanisms that would
ensure sufficient decreases in groundwater pumping to protect the spring
flows at San Marcos and Comal Springs.130 The court also ordered the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) to determine how many
cubic feet per second needed to flow into each spring system to ensure the
species’ survival.131 The court issued interim spring flow levels based on
expert testimony at trial pending the USFWS’s findings.132
The failure of Texas or the USFWS to comply with the court’s order
could have meant that Judge Bunton could find either in contempt, and
uncertainty existed as to whether the USFWS could assume control over
regulating the Edwards should Texas fail to devise an effective regulatory
entity.
Senate Bill 1477: Codified Secondary Rules of Aquifer Use
The Edwards Aquifer Authority Act, or S.B. 1477, created the most
comprehensive groundwater regulation in Texas history. The Authority
summarized its own powers as follows:133
To issue permits on all wells that do not meet exempt well
requirements;
To limit the total amount of annual water withdrawals to
572,000 acre-feet;
To have meters on all wells that do not meet exempt well
requirements;
To require drought restrictions that include specific triggers
and reduction amounts;
To include a built-in interest group to consider the effect of
the EAA’s actions on downstream users.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.
Sierra Club, 1993 U.S. Dist. WL 151353 at 14–23.
Id. at 33–34.
GULLEY, supra note 81, at 45.
EAA Timeline, supra note 4.
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Conspicuously, S.B. 1477 established a nine-member appointed
board.134 Section 1.09135 of the act would have achieved a rough appointed
balance between urban users (Bexar County) (3), irrigation users (2)
(Medina, Uvalde, and Atascosa Counties), spring users (Comal and Hays
Counties) (2), a rotating member chosen from irrigation user counties (1),
and an at-large advisory committee member (1):
(a) The authority is governed by a board of nine directors.
(b) The board consists of:
(1) a member appointed by the South Central Texas Water
Advisory Committee created by this Act;
(2) three residents of Bexar County, with two residents
appointed by the governing body of the city of San Antonio and
one resident appointed by the Commissioners Court of Bexar
County to represent cities and communities in the county other
than the city of San Antonio;
(3) one resident of Comal County or the city of New
Braunfels appointed by the Commissioners Court of Comal
County;
(4) one resident of Hays County appointed by the governing
body of the city of San Marcos;
(5) one resident of Medina County appointed by the
governing body of the Medina Underground Water Conservation
District;
(6) one resident of Uvalde County appointed by the
governing body of the Uvalde Underground Water Conservation
District, and;
(7) one person appointed in rotation who is from Atascosa,
Medina, or Uvalde counties, with that person appointed by the
governing body of the Evergreen Underground Water District, by
the Medina Underground Water Conservation District, or by the
Uvalde County Underground Water Conservation District with
the person appointed by the Evergreen Underground Water
District serving the first term, followed by a person appointed by
the Medina Underground Water Conservation District to serve the
second term, followed by a person appointed by the Uvalde
County Underground Water Conservation District to serve the
third term, and rotating in that order of appointment for
subsequent terms.

134. GULLEY, supra note 81, at 53 (“Senate Bill 1477 created the Edwards Aquifer
Authority. The authority would have a nine–member board of appointed directors”).
135. Edwards Aquifer Authority, The Edwards Aquifer Authority Act, https://
perma.cc/6LJM-PZ22.
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On Preclearance Review under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice (Justice) refused to
approve the appointed board.136 The subsequent section of this article
explores in greater depth the Voting Rights implications of S.B. 1477’s
appointed board and its ultimate rejection by the Department of Justice.
S.B. 1477’s Appointed Board Under Voting Rights Act Scrutiny:
State of Texas v. United States
As just discussed, Section 1.09 of S.B. 1477 provided for a ninemember board, with three representatives from each of the user group
regions. The immediate issue under evaluation under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act concerned the creation of an appointive board in the
same piece of legislation that dissolved the Edwards Underground Water
District, whose board members were elected.137 However, Texas officials
knew that Department of Justice scrutiny under the Voting Rights Act
represented a serious obstacle to the ultimate survival and success of the
new Authority, since changes in the structure of the Authority’s board
pursuant to the Voting Rights Act could cause the Authority’s potential
constituents in the two less-populated regions to reject it altogether.138
The Voting Rights Act obstacles that S.B. 1477 created paralleled the
type of malapportioned representation that prompted the first reform of
legislative districts in Texas. In 1936, the state legislature amended the
redistricting provisions in the state constitution to place a ceiling on the
number of representatives possible from any one county.139 This ceiling
served to protect the traditionally influential rural districts and to dilute the
increasingly populous urban areas.140 The ceiling also assumed ethnic and
racial dimensions, since the urban areas contained larger concentrations of
Hispanic and African-American voters.141 By the mid-1960s, courts found
disparities in the number of representatives per unit of population to be as
great as 4.4 to 1.142

136. GULLEY, supra note 81, at 57.
137. Id. at 57–58 (explaining the shift from an elected to an appointed board and the
dilution of Hispanic voter strength even if elected).
138. See Turner Letter November 19, 1993, supra note 104 (denying Texas Preclearance under Section 5 of Voting Rights Act for EAA appointed board created by S.B.
1477).
139. Steve Bickerstaff, State Legislative and Congressional Apportionment in Texas:
A Historical Perspective, 37(2) PUB. AFF. COMMENT. 1–3 (1991).
140. Id.
141. Bickerstaff, supra note 139.
142. Bush v. Martin, 224 F. Supp. 499, 506 (S.D.Tex. 1963), aff’d per curiam 376
U.S. 222 (1964).
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Had S.B.1477 proposed a board for the Edwards Aquifer Authority
that called for elected rather than appointed members, the 3-3-3 structure
of the board according to aquifer user groups would have reproduced the
same type of population and ethnic/racial disparities found in the preVoting Rights Act Texas legislative districts, but in exaggerated form.
Statistics produced by the Texas Legislative Council reflect that the total
voting-age populations of the three regions were as follows:
Spring User Region.
Comal County, Hays County, part of Guadalupe County, and
part of Caldwell County: 130,954 (3 representatives).
Urban User Region.
Bexar County: 1,185,394 (3 representatives).
Irrigation User Region.
Medina County, Uvalde County, part of Atascosa County,
part of Kinney County: 52, 901 (3 representatives)143
The first state legislative districts challenged in Texas had given rural
counties up to 4.4 times the representation of urban regions.144 If the
original 3-3-3 Edwards Aquifer Authority Board had been elected,
multiplication based on the above 1990 census numbers from the three user
regions yields a surprising result: the vote of a person who lived in the
spring user region resident would have 9.05 times the representation of a
person in the urban user region. The vote of an irrigation user region
resident would have 22.4 times the representation of a person in the urban
user region. As Senator Armbrister—who authored S.B. 1477, which
created the EAA—had put it, San Antonio water policy leadership “took it
on the chin” by agreeing to an arrangement that in no way conformed to a
one person, one vote standard.145
Moreover, as with the first state legislative districts challenged in
Texas, the Edwards Aquifer Authority’s urban–rural skew took on ethnic
and racial dimensions. The above-cited 1990 census numbers indicate that,
taken together, approximately 657,305 African-American and Hispanic
voters lived in the counties that contained the Edwards Aquifer Authority.
Of these voters, 589,180 lived in Bexar County. If the proposed 3-3-3
board had been elective, approximately 89.6 percent of minority voters
would have lived in the user region that suffered the most drastic voter
dilution.146 This comparison with pre–Voting Rights Act Texas legislative
143. The Texas Legislative Council, Redistricting Process, https://perma.cc/6XMY42YF.
144. Bickerstaff, supra note 139.
145. Audio tape: Texas Senate, 73d Leg., R.S., S.B. 1477 Open Floor Debate (May
11, 1993) (on file with Texas Legislative Reference Library).
146. The Texas Legislative Council, supra note 143.
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districts raises the issue that would become critical for the State of Texas if
the Department of Justice were to require the Authority’s board to be
elected rather than appointed: whether, or to what extent, the Edwards
Aquifer Authority board should be compared to a general purpose unit of
government like a city council or state legislature, and to what extent the
Authority should be construed as a special purpose water district, to which
the Supreme Court has largely declined to apply voting rights principles.147
If the Justice Department and the courts had characterized the
Edwards Aquifer Authority as a general purpose unit of government, the
more representation from Bexar County would be required to satisfy the
one person, one vote requirement. As Bexar County’s weight on the
Authority’s board increased, the likelihood of cooperation with the new
Authority from the spring user and irrigation user regions decreased
precipitously. The 3-3-3 configuration was perceived as important in the
effort to assure the irrigation and spring user regions that Bexar County’s
overwhelming population advantage would not be used to drown out the
interests of the two less-populated regions.148 As discussed subsequently,
these considerations were at issue in the summer and fall of 1993, when the
Texas Secretary of State submitted articles defending the Edwards Aquifer
Authority’s appointed board of directors to the Department of Justice for
evaluation under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.149
The procedure by which S.B. 1477’s appointed board was evaluated
requires a brief explanation. In Beer v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court held that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was
designed to ensure that proposed changes in voting procedures did not lead
to a retrogression in racial minorities’ capacity to participate effectively in
the electoral process.150 Because it was among those states with a history
of “substantial voting discrimination,” Texas was required to fulfill the
requirements of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.151
The provisions of Section 5 became effective whenever Texas
“enact[ed] or [sought] to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite
to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting . . . .”152
In NAACP v. Hampton County Election Commission, the United States
Supreme Court held that a voting-related enactment should be submitted
for preclearance not only where the changes had the purpose or effect of
impairing minority voting rights, but where “the challenged alteration has
147. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719
(1973).
148. GULLEY, supra note 81, at 51–58.
149. See infra at 64–68 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (current version at 52 U.S.C.
§ 10304 (2020))).
150. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1976).
151. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 329 (1966).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2020)).
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the potential for discrimination.”153 Whatever the purpose or effect on
voting rights, Texas had to submit the changes that S.B. 1477 wrought to
the Department of Justice.
In seeking preclearance from the Department of Justice, or in a
subsequent declaratory judgment action in federal court, Texas bore the
burden of demonstrating that the proposed change had neither
discriminatory purpose nor effect.154 If the Department of Justice raised an
objection, Texas could seek a declaratory judgment in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia.155 In order for the proposed
measure to become law, the court was required to enter a judgment that the
proposed “qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does
not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race or color . . . .”156 Until the court issued
such an order, no person was to be denied the right to vote for failure to
comply with the proposed procedure.157
S.B. 1477’s appointed board came under scrutiny as a “qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice or procedure” related to voting because of
the proposed abolition of the Edwards Underground Water District under
Section 1.41, which an elected board administered and whose configuration
had recently changed to better conform to the Voting Rights Act.158
In Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, the Supreme Court considered
whether state officials in Mississippi were required to submit for Section 5
preclearance a plan that would take away from the school districts of eleven
counties the prerogative to choose between appointing or electing their
superintendents.159 Under the proposed plan, the state legislature granted
the boards of education power to appoint the school superintendents in
those eleven counties. Allen held that such a change required Section 5
preclearance:
[a]n important county officer in certain counties was made
appointive instead of elective. The power of a citizen’s vote is
affected by this amendment; after the change, he is prohibited
from electing an officer formerly subject to the approval of the
voters. Such a change could be made either with or without

153. NAACP v. Hampton County Election Commission, 470 U.S. 166, 181 (1985).
154. Beer, 425 U.S. at 130, 140–41.
155. Texas v. U.S., 866 F. Supp. at 26–27.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c).
157. John P. MacCoon, The Enforcement of the Preclearance Requirement of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 107, 108 n.5 (1980).
158. Texas v. U.S., 866 F. Supp. at 26–27.
159. Allen et al. v. State Board of Elections et al., 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
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discriminatory purpose or effect; however, the purpose of Section
5 was to submit such changes to scrutiny.160
The Allen Court was careful to emphasize that a change from an
elected to an appointed system did not in itself indicate the presence of a
discriminatory purpose or effect but did require Section 5 evaluation.161
Pursuant to Allen, the administrative standards by which the Department of
Justice evaluated Section 5 submission listed a change from elected to
appointed offices as a “change in voting” under the Act.162
Justice Harlan’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Allen captures
the fundamental problem in attempting to evaluate a change from elective
to appointive offices under the Voting Rights Act:
The statute involved in Bunton v. Patterson [r]aises a somewhat more
difficult question of statutory interpretation. If one looks to its impact on
the voters, the State’s law making the office of school superintendent enacts
a “voting qualification” of the most drastic kind. While under the old
regime all voters could cast a ballot, now none are qualified. On the other
hand, one can argue that the concept of “voting qualification” presupposes
that there will be a vote.163
In the dispute concerning the Edwards Aquifer Authority, the
Department of Justice took the view of the newly created, appointed board
as imposing the most drastic kind of voter qualification because it
eliminated the opportunity to vote that had existed with the EUWD
board.164 From this perspective, the change proposed by Texas could
represent the “absolute prohibition on casting a ballot” described in
Reynolds v. Sims.165
The state of Texas, however, saw that an “effect on voting
qualifications presupposed the existence of a vote.”166 No entity had ever
exercised the type or extent of powers vested in the new Edwards Aquifer
Authority (EAA), which made it difficult to compare the new authority with
the Edwards Underground Water District (EUWD). Had the citizens who
exercised their voting rights to determine EUWD representatives lost
power over functions the appointed EAA would now perform? Or were the
functions of the new EAA sui generis, so that it would be illogical to speak

160. Allen, 393 U.S at 569–570.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 562; see also 28 C.F.R. § 51.12(1).
163. Allen, 393 U.S at 592.
164. Turner Letter November 19, 1993, supra note 104.
165. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 535 (1964).
166. Letter from Hon. John Hannah, Jr., Texas Sec’y of State, to James P. Turner,
Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., C.R. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Dec. 30, 1993) (on file at the
Texas Legislative Reference Library) [hereinafter Hannah Letter December 30, 1993].
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in terms of the new board replacing the old one and subsuming the
EUWD’s authorities?
At the time that Texas submitted the Edwards Aquifer Authority board
plan for preclearance in 1993, the Edwards Underground Water District
was in the midst of litigation to reformulate its board member districts
under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in Williams v. Edwards
Underground Water District.167 The Edwards Underground Water District
had included five counties from its inception in 1959 until 1989: Hays,
Comal, Bexar, Medina, and Uvalde.168 In 1989, in direct response to the
aquifer plans proposed by the Regional Aquifer Coalition to the state
legislature, Medina and Uvalde Counties withdrew from the Edwards
Underground Water District and created their own underground water
districts.169
As of 1990, when the EUWD was composed of Bexar, Hays, and
Comal Counties only, its total population consisted of 1,261,098 people,
48.7 percent of whom were Hispanic.170 The Hispanic percentage of the
voting age population in the district was 44.5 percent.171 Ninety-four
percent of the EUWD’s constituents lived in Bexar County.172 From 1959
until 1989, when the EUWD’s twelve board members were elected at large,
no Hispanic person had ever been elected to the EUWD board.173 In 1989,
the EUWD changed to a mixed system of board members elected from
single-member districts and at large.174 In Bexar County, four board
members were elected from single-member districts, and two were elected
at large.175 Three board members from Comal County and three from Hays
County were elected at large.176 Two of the Bexar County districts had
Hispanic majorities among the voting age population.177 After the 1989
change to the mixed at-large and districted system, these two districts in
Bexar County consistently elected Hispanic board members.178 The atlarge elections in Hays County (27.8% Hispanic) and Comal County
(22.9% Hispanic) failed to produce Hispanic board members.179 In 1992,
167. See Williams v. Edwards Underground Water District, No. 92-CA0144 (W.D.
Texas 1993) (cited and explain in Texas v. U.S, 866 F. Supp. 20, 21 n.3 (D.D.C. 1994))
168. Gray, supra note 120.
169. GULLEY, supra note 81, at xxii.
170. Turner Letter November 19, 1993, supra note 104, at 2.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (discussing EUWD and denying Texas Pre-clearance under Section 5 of
Voting Rights Act for EAA appointed board created by S.B. 1477).
175. Turner Letter November 19, 1993, supra note 104, at 2.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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the League of United Latin American Citizens and other plaintiffs brought
suit in Williams v. Edwards Underground Water District, to change all
twelve board member positions to single-member districts.180
On May 5, 1994, while the new appointive Edwards Aquifer Authority
Board was still under consideration, a consent decree was entered that
would change the EUWD’s twelve-member board to six single-member
districts in Bexar County, three districts in Comal County, and three atlarge districts in Hays County.181 The United States Attorney General
approved the proposed EUWD election system on July 26, 1994, with the
first elections under the new system to be held on November 8, 1994.182
Even the configuration of EUWD districts approved by the Justice
Department incorporated the special purpose district principles from
decisions like Salyer, discussed in more detail subsequently.183 By splitting
up board member positions according to counties, the EUWD board took
into account the differing user interests between the urban user region,
Bexar County, and the two counties constituting the spring user region:
Hays and Comal Counties.184 These two user regions each received half of
the total representation on the EUWD board: six members from Bexar
County, and three each from Hays and Comal Counties.185 As the
population and ethnicity statistics already discussed indicate, the approved
EUWD board would fail in terms of one person, one vote and minority vote
dilution if judged as a general purpose unit of government. The evaluation
of minority voting strength within each user region becomes important in
creating such hybrid schemes of representation, as the discussion of H.B.
3189 in a subsequent section suggests.186
Despite the undeniable dilution of voting in the EUWD’s
configuration, the Justice Department reviewed the proposal to abolish the
EUWD and create the Edwards Aquifer Authority in the context of recent
litigation that had resulted in better representation of Hispanic voters on the

180. See Williams, No. 92-CA0144.
181. Texas v. U.S., 866 F. Supp. at 21 (“[T]he EUWD was the subject of a lawsuit
brought by Hispanic and African–American voters3 pursuant to Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. On May 5, 1994, a consent decree was entered in Williams providing that the
EUWD be governed by a twelve-member board elected from six single-member districts in
Bexar County, three single-member districts in Comal County and three single-member
districts in Hays County. This new election system was approved by the Attorney General
of the United States on July 26, 1994 and is presently being implemented. The first election
will be held on November 8, 1994, but several years will pass before the full new system
will be in place.”).
182. Id.
183. Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 726–29, 731–33.
184. See Williams, No. 92-CA0144.
185. See Texas v. U.S., 866 F. Supp. at 22.
186. See infra at 56–65 (discussion of H.B. 3189).
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EUWD board.187 It was this perceived progress of the EUWD that formed
the backdrop for the Justice Department’s evaluation of S.B. 1477 under
the retrogression standard cited above from Beer v. United States.188 From
Texas’s perspective, the Justice Department should have viewed S.B. 1477
as subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to the extent that Section
1.41 of the statute abolished the EUWD but otherwise as an independent
event.189 Evaluating the Edwards Aquifer Authority’s appointive board in
relation to the EUWD made as much sense as comparing the EAA to the
Medina County Underground Water District: none of the existing
underground water districts possessed powers that approached those of the
EAA qualitatively.
However, James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General in the
Civil Rights Department of the Justice Department, made clear in his
November 19, 1993 response to submissions from Texas in August,
September, and November, that the question was framed as the replacement
of an elected board with an appointed one and would be evaluated
accordingly:
Our review of this legislation under Section 5 is limited
solely to those aspects that deal with voting. Specifically, the
proposed dissolution of the elected twelve-member board that
manages a portion of the Edwards Aquifer and its replacement by
an appointed board is a change affecting voting within the
meaning of Section 5.190
Viewed without reference to the history of the efforts to regulate the
Edwards Aquifer, both the Department of Justice and subsequently the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia understandably saw the EAA as
replacing the EUWD.191 S.B. 1477 explicitly called for the transfer of
personnel, funds, and responsibilities from the one entity to the other.192
One must ask, however, how the Justice Department could conduct a
proper analysis of S.B. 1477 that was “limited solely to those aspects that
related to voting” without analyzing just what the new board would do. For
example, in Allen, voters lost control over officials performing exactly the
same duties: those of county superintendent of education.193 Voters elected
187. Turner Letter November 19, 1993, supra note 104.
188. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.
189. Texas v. U.S., 866 F. Supp. at 24 n.8.
190. Turner Letter November 19, 1993, supra note 104, at 1.
191. Texas v. U.S., 866 F. Supp. at 23–24.
192. Id.
193. Allen, 393 U.S. at 550–51 (requiring eleven counties in Mississippi to appoint
instead of electing their county superintendents of education violated Section 5 of Voting
Rights Act).
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EUWD representatives to an information-disseminating, data-gathering
body with some drought management powers, whereas the EAA would be
a regional authority that would comprehensively manage any and all water
drawn from the aquifer in a manner unprecedented in Texas history. If
EUWD voters had been electing representatives to do different and fewer
things than appointed EAA representatives would do, then the substantive
differences between the two entities necessarily affected “those aspects
related to voting.”
Moreover, from Texas’s perspective, the Justice Department’s
description of the EUWD—that it managed “a portion of the Edwards
Aquifer”—should have indicated that the EAA was not replacing the
EUWD. Medina and Uvalde Counties together constituted the irrigation
region, which used roughly a quarter of the water drawn from the aquifer.194
If these counties did not comprise a part of a regional board, then the aquifer
could not be regulated. Moreover, Hays and Medina Counties clearly did
not regard the EUWD as their most important, powerful, or effective
representative body for aquifer regulation, since the Guadalupe-Blanco
River Authority and other spring user regional interests had pursued the
endangered species litigation independent of the EUWD. Effectively, the
EUWD became a Bexar County organization with some input from the
spring user group region: Hays and Comal Counties. The third user group
region had withdrawn entirely. The Department of Justice disregarded
these political realities and also failed to distinguish among the user group
regions. The different configuration simply represented an “expansion”
with a negligible effect on population:
The appointed body would have authority over a larger geographic
area than the existing water district, as it includes Medina and Uvalde
Counties and portions of other counties not in the water district [the
EUWD]. However, this expansion did not significantly alter the population
as nearly 87 percent of the population in this geographic region was still in
Bexar County in the early 1990s.195
If one accepts that the relationship between the EUWD and the EAA
was one of dissolution and replacement, it was clear that minority
representation would be diluted. Of the three regions of the EAA, the
Justice Department pointed out that only Bexar County had any significant
Hispanic representation on the appointing bodies, and none of the
appointing bodies had Hispanic majorities.196 The appointive system
would provide Hispanic voters with a more attenuated, less predictable
194. Turner Letter November 19, 1993, supra note 104; see Edwards Underground
Water District, Report of the Technical Data Review Panel on the Water Resources of the
South Central Texas Region, 18 (Nov. 1992) (describing groundwater consumption in
Medina and Uvalde Counties) https://perma.cc/2E9D-6MRE.
195. Turner Letter November 19, 1993, supra note 104, at 2.
196. Id. at 2–3.
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means of influencing the leadership of the aquifer board. The Justice
Department acknowledged that the new board was created in response to
the Sierra Club litigation but noted that nothing in Judge Bunton’s ruling
required the creation of an appointive board and that some Hispanic
legislators had offered alternative legislation that would have preserved the
measure of minority representation achieved on the EUWD board.197
Moreover, the Justice Department pointed out that the state could not
discharge its burden of showing no discriminatory purpose or effect by
pointing to a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the change.198
Hence, under City of Rome v. United States, the Sierra Club litigation could
not serve to eliminate objections based on the potentially discriminatory
effects of the change to an appointed board.199 The Justice Department
letter concluded that the state of Texas failed to discharge its burden of
demonstrating that the appointed board would not lead to a retrogression of
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral
franchise.200 Once qualitative distinctions between the EUWD and the
proposed EAA were obliterated, the Justice Department’s assessment
understandably paralleled Justice Steven’s description in his dissenting
opinion in Presley v. Etowah County Commission:
Changes from district voting to at-large voting, the
gerrymandering of district boundary lines, and the replacement of
an elected official with an appointed official all share the
characteristic of enhancing the power of the majority over a
segment of the political community that might otherwise be
adequately represented.201
The state of Texas’s second strategy for attempting to obtain
preclearance—preserving the EUWD but transferring its regulatory powers
to the Edwards Aquifer Authority—was frustrated by the view expressed
in this further observation by Justice Stevens:
A resolution that reallocates decision making power by
transferring authority from an elected district representative to an
official, or a group, controlled by the majority, has the same
potential for discrimination against the constituents in the
disadvantaged districts.202

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
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Upon receiving the Justice Department’s letter of November 19, 1993,
Stuart Henry, counsel for the Sierra Club, requested reconsideration of the
decision in a letter dated December 22, 1993.203 Second, the Sierra Club
asked for a clarification of the objection letter, inquiring whether the Justice
Department’s letter could be construed only to object to the abolition of the
EUWD, and not to the EAA’s creation standing alone.204 Third, the Sierra
Club asked the Department of Justice to review two alternatives that had
been submitted to Governor Richards: one that would drop S.B. 1477’s
Section 1.41, which repealed the EUWD, and which would permit the
EUWD and the EAA to coexist; the other alternative would grant to the
TNRCC powers sufficient to regulate the aquifer.205 With respect to these
two alternative pieces of legislation, the Sierra Club requested the
following:
If the Department will not reverse its decision, then we
request that you advise Governor Richards that: (1) if Alternative
No. 1 is passed into law, the Department will withdraw its
objection with respect to Chapter 626 [S.B. 1477] as so amended
because it is no longer a request for a change affecting voting
within the meaning of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act; and (2)
if Alternative 2 is passed into law, the Department will have no
objection because it is not a proposal for a change affecting voting
. . . .206
Noting the dissimilarities between the EUWD and the EAA in terms
of geography and powers, the Sierra Club concluded:
It is irrelevant whether existing state law may already to
some extent authorize the TNRCC, EUWD, Medina County
Underground Water Conservation District, area cities and other
local governmental entities to “regulate” withdrawals within some
or all of the area overlying the aquifer. An explicit statement from
the legislature that either the new EAA or the TNRCC has the
necessary aquifer-wide permitting authority is needed to avoid
further litigation over state law. Such an explicit statement,
together with your confirmation that the new law is not a change
affecting voting within the meaning of Section 5 of the Voting

203. Letter from Stuart Henry, Counsel for Sierra Club, to James P. Turner, Acting
Assistant Att’y Gen., C.R. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Dec. 22, 1993) (on file with Author)
[hereinafter Henry Letter December 22, 1993].
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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Rights Act, hopefully will end the footdragging and finger
pointing.207
The foot dragging and finger pointing did not end. In January 1994,
Governor Richards refused to call a special session of the legislature to
consider the two forms of legislation proposed by the Sierra Club.208
However, in letters dated December 30, 1993, and January 19, 1994,
Secretary of State John Hannah attempted to achieve, without the benefit
of legislation, the Sierra Club’s first alternative: the coexistence of the
EUWD and the EAA to eliminate the problem of dissolving an elected
board.209 Secretary of State Hannah suggested that the objection letter of
the Department of Justice itself operated to prohibit the implementation of
Section 1.41 of S.B. 1477 abolishing the EUWD, but that no objection had
been raised to the implementation of the remainder of S.B. 1477.210 Hannah
explained that there was no conflict in state law in allowing the two entities,
especially in light of the “largely educational” role played by the EUWD.211
Hannah concluded that the coexistence of the EAA and EUWD would
result in the “reallocations of authority within government” and shifts in
power “among officials answerable to the same or different constituencies”
described in Presley v. Etowah County Commission.212 As such, S.B. 1477
without Section 1.42 would not be a change affecting voting as
contemplated by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Hannah concluded by
reminding the Department of Justice that Judge Bunton would appoint a
federal monitor by January 7, 1994, after which time federal intervention
in aquifer management would soon follow.213 In order to avoid a true
federal “takeover” of the aquifer, Texas needed to meet the aquifer
management deadline outlined in S.B. 1477.214

207. Henry Letter December 22, 1993, supra note 203.
208. GULLEY, supra note 81, at 58 (“Governor Richards rejected the possibility of a
special session, stating that ‘a special session is not going to solve it.’”).
209. Letter from Hon. John Hannah, Jr., Texas Sec’y of State, to James P. Turner,
Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., C.R. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., (Dec. 30, 1993) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Hannah Letter December 30, 1993]; Letter from Hon. John Hannah, Jr.,
Tex. Sec’y of State, to James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., C.R. Div., U.S. Dep’t
of Just. (Jan. 19, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hannah Letter January 19, 1994].
210. Hannah Letter December 30, 1993, supra note 209.
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The Department of Justice disagreed with Hannah’s application of
Presley to the proposed coexistence of the EAA and the EUWD.215 An
objection filed with Justice by the Chairperson of the EUWD, JoAnn S.
DeHoyos, had served to erode the credibility of Hannah’s argument. In an
act that reflected a keener sense for her organization’s survival than for the
survival of the natural resource her organization regulated, Ms. DeHoyos
wrote that the Secretary of State had mischaracterized the powers and
duties of the EUWD as “largely educational;” in fact, the EUWD allegedly
possessed broad responsibility to manage and control the aquifer.216 The
Justice Department’s attorneys did their own evaluation of the proposed
EUWD–EAA coexistence.217 The Justice Department found that the new
law “gives the newly-created appointed body substantially all of the
responsibilities that the elected body currently has.”218 Further, the Justice
Department argued that there existed significant conflict in the
responsibilities of the two organizations, and S.B. 1477 gave preeminent
power to the new EAA where any such conflict arose.219 As a result, the
Justice Department concluded that Presley’s holding did not remove S.B.
1477 from consideration under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.220 S.B.
1477 fell into the category described in Presley as “[c]ircumstances [that]
rise to the level of a de facto replacement of an elective office with an
appointive one [and require Section 5 preclearance].”221 The sole chance
that remained for the approval of the EAA’s appointed board was
preclearance via summary judgment motion in federal district court.
The delay in implementing the Edwards Aquifer Authority carried
serious consequences in the ongoing judicial oversight of the state pursuant
to the Sierra Club litigation. Before the state had filed its action in the
District of Columbia in an attempt to achieve preclearance for S.B. 1477,
the Sierra Club had filed a motion on November 12, 1993, requesting the
appointment of a water monitor. Judge Bunton granted the motion because
“[n]o plan [was] in effect by any Federal[,] State [,] or local government
entity that adequately protects against violations of the ESA caused by
unregulated pumping from the Edwards Aquifer.”222 The Sierra Club’s
215. Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., C.R. Div., U.S. Dep’t
of Just., to John Hannah, Tex. Sec’y of State (Mar. 24, 1994) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Turner Letter March 24, 1994].
216. Letter from JoAnn DeHoyos, Chairperson of Edwards Underground Water
Dist., to Steven Rosenbaum, Chair, Voting Section, U.S. Dept. of Just. (Feb. 1, 1994) (on
file with author).
217. Turner Letter March 24, 1994, supra note 215.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 4 (quoting Presley, 502 U.S. at 508).
222. GULLEY, supra note 81, at 58 (“Governor Richards rejected the possibility of a
special session, stating that ‘a special session is not going to solve it.’”).
39

Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1, Winter 2021

motion was filed pursuant to the Court’s Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, which had permitted plaintiffs to request additional
relief after May 31, 1993, if Texas did not have in effect at that time “a
regulatory system pursuant to which withdrawals from the Edwards
Aquifer can and will be limited to whatever extent may be required to avoid
unlawful takings of listed species [even] in a repeat of the drought of
record.”223
The delay that Voting Rights Act scrutiny caused led Judge Bunton to
appoint a federal water monitor by an order dated February 25, 1994, to
take effect in April 1994.224 The court found that the volume and
complexity of the information combined with the expertise necessary to
understand the information required the appointment of a monitor to assist
the court in imposing “possible future remedial actions” should they
become necessary.225 The appointment of the federal monitor signaled the
possible onset of direct court intervention in the management of the aquifer.
The monitor would continue in his tasks until “the State of Texas
implements an adequate regulatory plan or system to prevent violations of
the E.S.A.”226
The State of Texas and the City of San Antonio therefore sought
Justice Department approval of S.B. 1477 under the extraordinary pressure
created by the federal monitor and the unknown plan the court might
impose after the monitor had gathered sufficient information.227 Unlike
minority leaders in San Antonio, city water policy employees saw federal
intervention, rather than underrepresentation on the EAA, as the ultimate
evil.228 One economist from Baylor University testified that real income in
Bexar County could fall by up to $3.25 billion, and as many as 136,700
jobs could be lost as a result of the reductions in groundwater pumping.229
Although these were worst-case scenario statistics used to persuade the
court, San Antonio had a tremendous incentive to retain as much control
over aquifer regulation as possible.230 The appointment of the federal
223. Cited in Order Appointing Federal Water Monitor, February 25, 1994, Sierra
Club v. Babbitt, No. MO-91-CA-069.
224. Order Appointing Federal Water Monitor, February 25, 1994, Sierra Club v.
Babbitt, No. MO-91-CA-069.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Interview by David Todd with Joe Moore, Jr., Federal Water Monitor, in San
Marcos, Tex., (June 22, 1999), TEX. LEGACY PROJECT, CONSERVATION HISTORY
ASSOCIATION OF TEXAS (published Nov. 12, 2015), https://perma.cc/2WVE-AKGM, (Joe
Moore, Jr., the federal water monitor for Judge Bunton, explained the reaction of San
Antonio’s leadership to federal intervention including the water monitor’s fact gathering
and drought-induced pumping limits to save Comal and San Marcos Springs).
228. Interview by David Todd with Joe Moore, Jr., supra note 227.
229. Texas Regulates the Edwards Aquifer, supra note 55, at 7.
230. Interview by David Todd with Joe Moore, Jr., supra note 227.
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monitor caused by the delay in preclearing S.B. 1477 was a harbinger that
San Antonio’s worst-case scenario might come to pass.
On March 9, 1994, the State of Texas filed a motion for summary
judgment before a three-judge panel in the Federal District Court for the
District of Columbia.231 Texas requested a declaratory judgment, either
that all sections of S.B. 1477 should be precleared, or that Section 5 of the
Voting Rights act was inapplicable to the provisions of S.B. 1477 except
for the abolition of the EUWD under Section 1.41.232 The panel’s decision,
rendered on October 20, 1994, refused to grant Texas either of its requested
forms of relief.233
The court in Texas v. United States reasoned that the application of
Section 5 to S.B. 1477 depended on whether the Edwards Aquifer
Authority was properly regarded as a replacement for the Edwards
Underground Water District and concluded either that it was or that fact
issues precluded summary judgment on the issue.234 The court pointed first
to “significant overlap in the geographic range and regulatory power” of
the two entities that made “meaningful differentiation impossible.”235
Second, the court pointed to Section 1.41, which transferred the files and
records, “real and personal property, leases, rights, contracts, staff, and
obligations,” and funds from the EUWD to the EAA and substituted the
EAA in any pending litigation or negotiations to which the EUWD was a
party.236 The court concluded from these summary judgment facts: “It is
difficult to conceive of a legislative scheme that would more thoroughly
replace an existing body.”237 Texas’s first request for relief, which asked
for preclearance of all provisions of S.B. 1477—including Section 1.41—
could not be granted.238
The court also refused to preclear S.B. 1477 while invalidating Section
1.41, which would have allowed the EUWD and the EAA to coexist.239 The
court held that Texas had failed to satisfy its burden to show the absence of
discriminatory purposes or effects associated with the legislation, even
without the abolition of the EUWD’s elected board.240
With respect to discriminatory purpose, the court pointed out that,
under Washington v. Davis and Rogers v. Lodge, proof of discriminatory
purpose may be circumstantial, and that the discriminatory purpose need
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
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not be the primary motivation.241 Texas pointed to three forms of proof to
demonstrate the absence of discriminatory purpose: (1) S.B. 1477 had been
enacted in response to the Sierra Club court order, (2) all Hispanic senators
and 23 of 25 Hispanic representatives had voted for the legislation in the
state legislature, and (3) both Interior Secretary Babbitt and Housing and
Urban Development Secretary Henry Cisneros supported the legislation,
Cisneros having urged the D.O.J. to preclear S.B. 1477 because it had no
discriminatory purpose.242 The United States responded (1) that the Sierra
Club orders had never required the creation of an appointed board; (2) that
several of the Hispanic state legislators had filed statements at the time of
S.B. 1477’s passage indicating that, although they were voting for the bill,
they felt it was discriminatory; and (3) that the statements of Babbitt and
Cisneros had no probative value.243 The court cited authority indicating
that the determination of motive or intent was inappropriate on summary
judgment.244 The defendants’ evidence created a fact issue that precluded
summary judgment as to discriminatory purpose.245
With respect to discriminatory effects, the State of Texas first argued
that the effects prong of Section 5 analysis cannot apply to the elimination
of an elected body because the effect will always be retrogressive: minority
voting power, along with everyone else’s, will always be reduced to zero.246
Texas reasoned that, since Bunton and other cases suggest that the abolition
of an elected body and creation of an appointed body does not automatically
show discrimination, but only requires Section 5 evaluation, the courts
cannot have intended to apply the usual discriminatory effects analysis to
the abolition of elected bodies.247 If the court were to evaluate minority
influence over Edwards water policy decisions, rather than voting power
per se, the court would conclude that Hispanic influence would actually
increase under the EAA.248 An expert for the State of Texas predicted, on
the basis of the entities that would appoint EAA board members, that
Hispanics would control two of the nine positions, as compared with two
of twelve positions under the EUWD.249
The Justice Department argued that the courts had rejected Texas’s
argument concerning the inapplicability of the effects test to the abolition
of elected bodies in cases like County Council of Sumner County v. United
241. Texas v. United States, 866 F. Supp. at 27 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 242 (1976); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982)).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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246. Id.
247. Texas v. United States, 866 F. Supp. at 27.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 28.
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States.250 Further, Justice observed that Texas had underestimated the
number of Hispanic board members that would serve on the EUWD, were
it allowed to exist: because of the consent decree in Williams v. Edwards
Underground Water District,251 which created new minority districts in
Comal and Hays Counties, the number of Hispanic EUWD board members
would increase.252
The court rejected Texas’s arguments under the effects prong of
Section 5.253 The replacement of an appointed with an elected board clearly
required evaluation of discriminatory effect; a change in governing
structure would not always result in retrogression to zero voting.254 The
case law dictated that the proper benchmark for evaluating the EAA board
was the newest configuration of the EUWD board under Williams, which
would produce more than two minority representatives.255 In any event, a
comparison of the EAA’s possible minority representation with that of the
EUWD involved issues of fact that were inappropriate for summary
determination.256 Under Section 5 procedure, the State of Texas would
have to begin the process of submitting plans to the Justice Department or
the District of Columbia court until preclearance could be obtained.257
In all likelihood, the drafters of the 3-3-3 appointive board for the
Edwards Aquifer Authority did purposefully discriminate against the
residents of Bexar County: not because of its large Hispanic population, but
because they believed that agreement to comprehensive regulation of the
Edwards Aquifer could not be attained unless Bexar County was grossly
underrepresented in terms of population. The likely fact that Bexar County
suffered discrimination based on the size of its population points to the
extreme difficulty of synthesizing the principles of the Voting Rights Act
with the realities of creating an entity to regulate a common pool resource
like an aquifer that is in danger of exhaustion.

250. Texas v. United States, 866 F. Supp. at 28 (citing County Council of Sumner
County v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 694 (D.D.C. 1983) (three judge court)).
251. See Williams, No. 92-CA0144.
252. Williams, No. 92-CA0144 at 22, 28.
253. Id. at 28.
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Federalist No. 10, Racially Polarized Voting, and Special Purpose
Districts
James Madison’s Federalist No. 10 contains the best-known
discussion in American political history concerning the guarantee of
minorities’ rights in the midst of hostile majorities.258 Madison traced the
existence of factions in society to natural differences in capabilities that led
to disparities in wealth; the minority he sought to protect consisted of
creditors, merchants, and other economic elites.259 The proposed
Constitution, Madison argued, would create a republic in which the
people’s representatives would represent huge areas and make decisions on
many competing interests.260 Under such a Constitution, Madison argued,
the danger of a majority faction forming around any single issue to
tyrannize a minority faction would be very small: “Extend the sphere, and
you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade
the rights of other citizens . . . .”261 The danger of tyranny would actually
increase with a series of smaller republics: “The smaller the society . . . the
more frequently will a majority be found out of the same party . . . the more
easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.”262
Madison provided examples of this argument down to the extreme
case: one majority oppressing one minority with respect to one issue.263
The problem of Edwards Aquifer Authority governance presents the
problem of two issues that present opportunities for majorities of the whole
to invade the rights of other citizens: the use of water from a finite common
pool resource, and race or ethnicity.
In his discussion of Voting Rights Act jurisprudence in the aftermath
of Thornburg v. Gingles, Samuel Issacharoff offers two insights into Voting
Rights jurisprudence that are especially pertinent to a discussion of the
Edwards Aquifer Authority.264 First, Voting Rights jurisprudence after
Thornburg v. Gingles—and before Shaw v. Reno265—focused on the
existence and extent of racially polarized voting patterns as an “evidentiary

258. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (R.P. Fairfield ed., 1981).
259. Id. at 17–18.
260. Id. at 20–21.
261. Id. at 22.
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264. See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833 (1992).
265. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1978); see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630 (1993); see also Holder v. Hall, 114 S.O. 2581 (1994).
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proxy” to substitute for the impossible task of measuring the
“responsiveness of governmental institutions to the needs of all citizens.”266
By focusing on racially polarized voting of a persistent and extreme
nature, post-Thornburg voting rights jurisprudence also sought to avoid
redistricting or reapportionment simply to remedy the ills that inevitably
befall the losers of a given election in a democratic system.267 Extreme and
persistent racially polarized voting, serving as an evidentiary proxy for nonresponsiveness to all citizens on an equal basis, served to indicate a failure
to allocate goods and services fairly among all the constituents of a
community.268 Post–Thornburg Voting Rights Act jurisprudence sought to
ensure that access to representative office would be a social good that an
“entrenched and racially defined majority community” could not
monopolize.269
With respect to the Voting Rights Act objection to the Edwards
Aquifer Authority, one should keep in mind that the delivery of city
services such as water has formed the basis of political disputes divided
along ethnic lines in San Antonio for decades. Communities Organized for
Public Service, an organization that represents poorer ethnic
neighborhoods, has put issues like drainage, police protection, and utilities
at the center of its struggles for predominantly Mexican-American
constituents.270 It is therefore understandable that the governance of the
Edwards Aquifer would concern some sectors of the Mexican-American
population in Bexar County.271
Some scholars have criticized Voting Rights jurisprudence by arguing
that “discrete and insular” minorities with intensely held beliefs on specific
issues actually exercise a disproportionate influence in the political system,
whereas heterogeneous majorities exhibit diffuse interests and a lack of
organization.272
Notwithstanding the disproportionate influence of
minorities united around specific issues such as gun control, Issacharoff
points to the empirical relevance of a single issue—race—that unites
otherwise heterogeneous white majorities with diffuse interests.273
Issacharoff points to statistics gleaned from elections throughout the United
States over time indicating that, despite diverse constituencies and issues,
race and ethnicity continue to play a decisive role in the voting choices of
266. Issacharoff, supra note 264, at 1884.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Communities Organized for Public Service and Metro Alliance, A Guide to the
C.O.P.S./Metro Alliance Records, 1954-2009, TEXAS ARCHIVAL RESOURCES ONLINE,
https:// perma.cc/6V4H-87K5.
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racial and ethnic majorities.274 Voting Rights jurisprudence after
Thornburg v. Gingles (and before Shaw v. Reno) focused on racially
polarized voting patterns as an attempt to correct for disproportionate
influence by majority factions united around the single issue of race and in
this sense addressed the concern raised in Federalist 10.275 Like an election
in a small geographic area that turns on a small number of issues, minority
interests are most likely jeopardized where a single issue like race
consistently motivates a majority.276
If one accepts the premise that racially polarized voting can serve as
an “evidentiary proxy” for nonresponsive governmental institutions, one
would agree that the counties comprising the Edwards Aquifer Authority
provide many indications of a local government that is nonresponsive to
minorities.
Statistics bore out persistent racially polarized voting in Bexar
County.277 LULAC cited statistical evidence of polarized voting in League
of United Latin American Citizens v. North East Independent School
District, in which LULAC sought to change a school district’s system of
board member elections from at-large to single-member districts.278
Statistical analysis of a wide variety of elections in Bexar County
demonstrated the existence of consistent Anglo block voting, as well as
block voting by African-American and Hispanic citizens.279 This polarized
voting meant that the at-large school board system excluded minority
candidates. Despite the fact that 24.6 percent of the school district’s
population was Hispanic, and 5.3 percent was African-American, from
1973 to 1994, Anglo candidates won forty-seven of forty-eight elections,
in which minority candidates consistently ran.280
The plaintiffs in LULAC also cited other Bexar County elections to
demonstrate polarized voting: state district judicial elections, tax assessorcollector elections, county commissioner elections, sheriff elections, State
Board of Education elections, Court of Criminal Appeals elections, and
elections for many other positions in Bexar County revealed less dramatic,
but statistically significant, polarized voting based on race and ethnicity.281
Voting rights scholars who have focused specifically on South Texas have
also documented racially and ethnically polarized voting in the counties to
274. Issacharoff, supra note 264, at 1880–90.
275. Id. at 1850–54.
276. Id. at 1881–90.
277. Nina Perales, Luis Figueroa & Griselda G. Rivas, Voting Rights in Texas: 1982–
2006, 17:2 S. CAL. REV. OF LAW AND SOC. JUST. 713, 741–42.
278. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. North East Indep. School Dist.,
903. F. Supp. 1071 (W.D. Texas 1995).
279. Id. at 1081.
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the southwest of San Antonio that depend on the Edwards Aquifer.282
Polarized voting by Anglos in these counties is more statistically
pronounced than in Bexar County.283 In order to elect a Hispanic political
official in Uvalde or Medina county, for example, evidence indicated a
district had to be “packed” to approximately 70 percent Hispanic voters,
the maximum extent allowable under Ketchum v. Byrne, which provided
guidelines on the extent to which supermajority minority districts can be
created to ensure representation under the Voting Rights Act.284
The need to prevent a tyranny of the majority united around a single
issue can also be seen along an entirely different axis, however: that of
water use. Reynolds v. Sims established principles that seem fundamental
to voting rights jurisprudence.285 Yet, the form of governance that the
Department of Justice ultimately approved for the Edwards Aquifer
Authority’s board directly contradicts these principles. Some of these
principles from Reynolds include, for example, that counties are not
sovereign entities but creatures of the state legislature and therefore cannot
receive representation as entities but must abide by the one person, one vote
principle, and that the vote of a farmer and a city dweller should weigh
exactly the same.286
In order to understand how the Edwards Aquifer Authority’s board
could satisfy Voting Rights Act requirements, one must look to those cases
in which the Supreme Court has created exceptions to basic Voting Rights
Act principles for so-called special purpose districts. Although no one in
the Edwards dispute characterized the Edwards Authority as a special
purpose unit of government, principles derived from these cases informed
the configuration of the EAA board.
In Avery v. Midland City, the United States Supreme Court applied
Voting Rights Act principles previously reserved for legislatures to local
governments.287 The Court found “[l]ittle difference, in terms of the
application of the Equal Protection Clause and the principles of Reynolds
v. Sims, between the exercise of state power through legislatures and the
exercise by elected officials through cities, towns, and counties.”288 The
Court found that the Midland County Commissioners’ Court possessed
mixed duties—legislative, executive, and judicial—that made it a “general
governing body.”289 The Court held that the commissioners’ court must be
redistricted in order to eliminate “single-member districts of substantially
282.
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unequal population.”290 Among local governments, the Court distinguished
such general governing bodies as a commissioners’ court from “specialpurpose organizations.”291 The Court commented:
Were the Commissioners’ Court a special-purpose unit of government
assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of
constituents more than other constituents, we would have to confront the
question whether such a body may be apportioned in ways which give
greater influence to the citizens most affected by the organization’s
functions . . . .The Constitution does not require that a uniform straitjacket
bind citizens in devising mechanisms of local government suitable for local
needs and efficient in solving local problems.292
The Supreme Court devised different ways to define a “general
purpose” government: in Hadley v. Junior College District the Supreme
Court construed “general” to mean “important” and concluded that the
importance of education justified the characterization of a community
college district as a general purpose unit of government.293 Justice Harlan’s
dissent pointed out the many functions normally associated with local
governments that the college district did not exercise.294
The Supreme Court also considered what form of disproportionate
effect on one set of constituents would trigger special purpose district
exception considerations: Cipriano v. City of Houma and City of Phoenix
v. Kolodziewski both involved municipal bond elections and refused to
allow property ownership as a prerequisite to voting.295 These cases
appeared to reject disproportionate economic interest in an election issue,
by itself, as a justification for deviating from Voting Rights Act principles.
Notwithstanding the Court’s disagreements in Avery, Cipriano, and
City of Phoenix, subsequent to these decisions, the Supreme Court
evaluated claims for special purpose district status under the Voting Rights
Act by (1) distinguishing general from special purpose local governments
on the basis of quality and quantity of functions and (2) evaluating the
existence of a disproportionate impact on one group of constituents that
would justify an exception to voting rights principles.296 In Salyer Land
Company v. Tulare Lake Basin Storage District, a water district formed
under the California Water District Storage Act acquired, stored, and
distributed water for farming in the Tulare Lake Basin in the San Joaquin
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Valley of California.297 The district’s enabling legislation restricted the
votes for the district’s board of directors to landowners and apportioned
votes according to real property assessments.298 Seventy-seven people
inhabited the Tulare Lake Basin, eighteen of whom were children.299 Most
of the fifty-nine adults worked for one of four corporations that owned 85
percent of the land in the Basin.300 In addition to the acquisition, storage,
and distribution of water, the district in Salyer possessed the power of
eminent domain to acquire, improve, and operate water storage facilities;
to generate hydroelectric power (which it did not do); to issue bonds to
finance its functions; to conduct flood control projects; and to coordinate
with federal and state agencies on water projects.301
The plaintiffs in Salyer were small landowners, landowner-lessees,
and residents, who alleged that the dilution or outright exclusion of their
vote for the water district board violated the Equal Protection Clause.302
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim, reasoning that “the
appellee water storage district, by reason of its special limited purpose and
of the disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners as a group, is
the sort of exception . . . [Hadley and Avery] . . . contemplated.”303 With
respect to the district’s limited functions, the Court focused on the water
district’s small set of objectives, rather than the list of powers granted to
the board to achieve those objectives.304 Justice Rehnquist wrote: “Its
primary purpose, indeed the reason for its existence, is to provide for the
acquisition, storage, and distribution of water for farming in the Tulare
Lake Basin.”305 With respect to the disproportionate impact on one group,
the Court reasoned that since property taxes financed all the district’s
projects, the extension of the franchise to landowners only was justified.306
The franchise was evaluated according to land benefitted, rather than
people benefitted.307 Justice Douglas argued in his dissent that the Court
had incomprehensibly approved a system that granted the franchise to
corporations and echoed the qualitative evaluation of government functions
found in Hadley v. Junior College District, supra: the flood control
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responsibilities of the district were of critical importance to all the dwellers
of the Basin, without regard to property ownership.308
In Ball v. James, the Supreme Court extended the limited
purpose/disproportionate impact analysis found in Salyer to exempt a water
district with far-reaching powers from Voting Rights Act requirements.309
The Salt River Agricultural Improvement and Power District of Arizona
stored and delivered untreated water for the irrigation of up to 236,000
acres in central Arizona.310 Forty percent of the district’s water, however,
went to non-agricultural, urban purposes.311
Further, the District subsidized its activities by selling hydroelectric
power to hundreds of thousands of people in an area that included half the
population of Arizona, including a large part of Phoenix.312 The district’s
powers included the exercise of eminent domain, the issuance of bonds, and
an influential role in the formation of flood control and environmental
management undertaken in conjunction with other agencies.313 The vote to
determine the board of directors was restricted to landowners with more
than one acre, with the number of votes determined by the assessed
property value.314
The plaintiffs, who owned no property or less than one acre, argued
that the almost 100 percent financing of the district’s projects from the
delivery of hydroelectric power, the delivery of 40 percent of the water to
urban areas, and the wide range of functions performed by the district all
served to place it outside the special purpose district exception.315 The
Ninth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that the hydroelectric
power operation had transformed this district from a Tulare Basin-type
operation into a unit of government with a variety of powers and
constituents.316 Landowners did not both finance and receive the benefits
of the district; hence landowners were no longer “disproportionately
affected.”317
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and held that
the special purpose district exception applied.318 With respect to the limited
purpose requirement, the Court held that this district’s primary purpose was
still the delivery of water for agricultural purposes, and the amount of water
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delivered was determined according to the number acres of the farm in
question.319 The water delivered to urban areas was delivered on an acreage
basis as well.320 It was therefore understandable that votes were pro-rated
according to property values.321 The district could not enact laws governing
people’s conduct; the district did not administer functions such as street
maintenance, schools, sanitation, health, or welfare service. [This analysis
harkens back to the quantitative, laundry list of functions approach to
determining whether a government entity is general or special purpose].322
The Court opined that the delivery of electricity was not a “traditional
element of government sovereignty.”323 The number of rate-paying
electricity customers could not convert the district into a general purpose
government.324 Urban electricity users stood in relation to the district as
customers to a utility company. Redress for utility users was in the state
legislature.325 With respect to the “disproportionate impact” requirement,
the Court found that because the district did not buy or sell water but only
charged to deliver it, the farmers relied on the hydroelectric power revenues
for the delivery of water to their farms.326 The structure of the vote
according to acres owned corresponded to this fundamental interest in the
continued delivery of irrigation water.327
Justice White’s dissent in Ball, joined by three other justices, argued
that restrictions on the franchise where the decisions of the governmental
unit affect all citizens’ lives can be justified only where such restrictions
serve a compelling state interest: In Salyer, seventy-seven people were
excluded from voting; in Ball, observed Justice White, half the voters of
Arizona were excluded.328 In Salyer, the property taxes levied against
voters served to fund the district; in Ball, rate payers funded virtually all
water functions. Justice White also pointed out that the Court had declared
utilities to be of general interest and subject to voting rights requirements
in Cipriano v. City of Houma.329
William H. Riker sought to offer a justification for the controversial
decision in Ball v. James by analyzing the special purpose district doctrine
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in the context of Madison’s Federalist No. 10.330 With respect to units of
government with many functions, Riker echoed Madison: the number of
issues on which Congress would vote, combined with the size of the
geographical area for which Congress would render decisions, would have
the effect of canceling out potentially dangerous majorities on any one
issue.331
Riker cited studies that confirmed Madison’s observations with
respect to legislative redistricting.332 According to these studies, no drastic
policy changes had resulted from the reapportionment mandated by
Reynolds v. Sims.333 The actual political and economic change wrought by
legislative redistricting had been subtle.334 Riker then contrasted the nature
of the policy changes wrought by redistricting with the hypothetical
consequences that would have resulted from a restructuring of the water
district in Ball v. James according to voting rights principles.335
The utility operation of the Salt River District paid for $14 million of
the $16.6 million cost of the total irrigation within its boundaries.336 The
rate-paying plaintiffs would have dominated the decision-making of the
water district had the district’s board been elected according to population.
Further, the ratepayers stipulated that, if allowed to vote in the water district
elections, they would shift the allocation of costs in the district to make
electricity cheaper.337 The accounting information available on the water
district’s operations indicated that the district’s board members acted as
rational firm managers, charging a profit-maximizing price both for water
delivery and for electricity.338 If the consumers prevailed, they either could
have continued this practice, in which case their rates would not have
changed, or the ratepayers could have acted as “myopic consumers,”
shifting the financial burden of the district toward property taxes and
increasing water costs disproportionately, up to six times the rate at the time
of litigation.339 The shift toward property taxes and increased water costs
could have had a catastrophic effect on the farmers and also could have
increased the debt of the district and caused its bankruptcy; a private firm
could then have taken over its operations.340

330. William H. Riker, Democracy and Representation: A Reconciliation of Ball v.
James and Reynolds v. Sims, 1 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39 (1982).
331. Id. at 41–48, 51–53.
332. Id. 39–44.
333. Riker, supra note 330, at 39, 41–48, 51–53.
334. Id. at 39–44.
335. Id. at 48–56.
336. Id. at 55–56.
337. Id. at 55–63.
338. Riker, supra note 330, at 55–63.
339. Id. at 55–61.
340. Id. at 55–59.
52

Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1, Winter 2021

Riker concluded that the test for applying voting rights principles
should be how drastic the effect on public policy would be.341 The smaller
the number of functions provided by the governmental unit, the more
drastic the change in policy wrought by a sudden shift in representation;
hence, the more restricted the franchise should be.342 This argument echoed
Federalist 10 and demonstrated the intimate connection between the two
aspects of the Supreme Court’s special purpose district analysis: the more
limited the functions performed by the governmental unit, the more drastic,
or disproportionate, the effect on one group will be.343 Under this view,
removing a unit of government from the special purpose district exception
solely on the basis that it performs a qualitatively important function would
make no sense whatsoever.344 In Riker’s view, the two-pronged
approach—number of governmental functions and disproportionate
impact—conformed to the Madisonian argument that made constitutional
sense of Ball v. James.345
Subsequent to the water district cases that limited the franchise based
on property ownership such as Salyer Land Company346 and Associated
Enterprises v. Toltec Watershed Improvement District,347 the principles
developed in these cases were applied to other forms of limited purpose
local government. These cases especially dealt with governmental units
that carried out a limited number of functions on a multi-county or multimunicipality basis, such as watershed control districts and public
transportation districts.348 The Edwards Aquifer Authority’s characteristics
place it within this second category of multi-county, limited purpose
districts rather than with the water districts.
In the multi-county special purpose district cases, the
“disproportionate impact” element of special purpose district analysis
results from the potential effect of more populous counties on less populous
counties that would result from strict adherence to population-based
representation. In Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, a
New York state statute enabled voters to redraw boundaries and reconfigure
duties among neighboring municipal governments.349 A majority of
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Niagara County dwellers had voted in favor of such a reconfiguration with
respect to a smaller municipality, Lockport. However, Lockport citizens
voted against the proposal.350
Niagara dwellers alleged that the provision in the New York
Municipal Home Rule Law allowing a smaller town to refuse a
reconfiguration that voters in a larger town had approved violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it weighted the smaller town’s votes much more
heavily.351 The Supreme Court analyzed this problem according to a
“substantial identity of interests” standard: if it could be shown that the
interests of the two sets of voters were substantially similar, then one
person, one vote should apply: Reynolds had dictated that municipalities
were instruments of the legislature and not sovereign unto themselves.352
However, a “substantial identity of interests” did not exist between
Niagara and Lockport citizens.353 The Court observed that the proposed
reorganization at issue would have shifted the balance of power between
town and county governments and would have shifted disproportionate
costs onto the smaller towns.354 As with the special purpose cases involving
water districts, the New York law at issue involved a limited issue:
procedures for the reorganization of local government structure. As in the
water district cases, the Court could discern a disproportionate impact on
one group: residents of small New York towns.355
Finally, as with water districts, Riker would argue that Federalist 10
analysis applied to the situation: The specific nature of the issue, combined
with the disproportionate impact on the numerically smaller constituency,
meant that a deviation from strict voting rights principles proved necessary.
One can immediately observe the applicability of “substantial identity of
interests” analysis to the counties comprising the three user groups of the
Edwards Aquifer Authority.
Although the special purpose district principles of limited
governmental purpose and disproportionate impact are directly applicable
to the Edwards Aquifer Authority, the policy justification for deviating
from one person, one vote in water district cases such as Salyer, Toltec, and
Ball is directly antithetical to the policy objectives of the EAA. The newly
created aquifer authority represented an attempt to move three disparate
aquifer user regions from default rules of usage that were exhausting the
aquifer to new rules designed to ensure the aquifer’s survival. The type of
special purpose water district addressed in Salyer, Toltec, and Ball, by
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contrast, dates from the turn of the twentieth century, when the western
states sought to encourage the development of water resources as part of a
strategy to encourage settlement.356 As Justice Rehnquist’s discussion in
Salyer reflects, property law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries sought to create infrastructure by encouraging entrepreneurial
opportunity with subsidies for certain categories of business enterprises.357
The restrictions on the franchise based on property ownership described in
these three cases reflect the control over local government states awarded
to those who were willing to create infrastructure by developing and
exploiting the state’s natural resources.358
In the context of the Edwards Aquifer dispute described in this report,
the logic implicit in Salyer, for example, might justify awarding almost
exclusive control over the aquifer to the irrigation farmers of Uvalde and
Medina Counties. Since these commercial farmers undertook the risk to
cultivate arid land for a profitable purpose, they would be rewarded with
political control over a natural resource important to their business. When
one concludes that the structure of the Edwards Aquifer Authority was
greatly influenced by the special purpose district exception to the Voting
Rights Act, one should therefore be careful to point out that the EAA
embodies principles developed with reference to the type of water districts
seen in Salyer and Ball but rests on different policy moorings. Even though
the EAA seeks to regulate the use of water, it actually belongs in the second
category of special purpose districts: the multi-county entity that regulates
one issue for all its member counties.
Finally, concerning the nature of the special purpose district
exception, when one reads cases like Salyer and Ball, in which the Supreme
Court upheld voting schemes that departed so drastically from otherwise
accepted voting rights principles, one might assume that the special purpose
district exception is an either-or proposition: either a governmental unit
must adhere to voting rights principles, or else the governmental unit can
ignore such principles altogether and even award the vote to corporations,
such as in Salyer. If the special purpose district exception were an eitheror proposition, however, the question would then arise of how the Edwards
Aquifer Authority resembled a special purpose district in some respects but

356. Salyer, 410 U.S. at 722 (Justice Rehnquist) (“In the beginning, the task of
reclaiming this area was left to the unaided efforts of the people who found their way by
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the gage of battle to the forces of nature. With imperfect tools, they built dams, excavated
canals, constructed ditches, plowed and cultivated the soil, and transformed dry and desolate
lands into green fields and leafy orchards.’”).
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still faced the Preclearance Process under Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act.
In Chappelle v. Greater Baton Rouge Airport District, the United
States Supreme Court held that a determination of special purpose district
status means that the Court does not apply strict scrutiny to evaluate
possible violations of Equal Protection.359 However, the Court also
concluded that special purpose district status does not eliminate Equal
Protection scrutiny altogether.360
When the Texas legislature drafted legislation to configure a
governing board for the Edwards Aquifer Authority that would satisfy
Section 5 scrutiny, it attempted to accommodate limitations on the
franchise that special purpose district considerations imposed with voting
rights principles that the Equal Protection Clause required.361 The ultimate
result was H.B. 3189, which amended S.B. 1477 to create an elected board
for the Edwards Aquifer Authority.
House Bill 3189: Conflicting Aquifer Interests Create a New
Board
San Antonio water policymakers attempted to “take it on the chin” for
the San Antonio Region in the effort to change the primary rules of aquifer
use and to create a new institution to enforce those rules. Professor
Ostrom’s analysis of common pool resource disputes suggests that the
voluntary sacrifice of perceived short-term self-interests by a dominant
common pool resource user can serve as a signal to other users that
engenders trust and the creation of “cooperative equilibrium.”362 The
Voting Rights challenge to the 3-3-3 plan for the EAA Board in essence
declared that San Antonio’s leadership did not have the constitutional
prerogative to act on behalf of the San Antonio region in sacrificing
population-based representation on the board to such a great extent. House
Bill 3189 was an attempt to keep intact the principle of sacrifice of selfinterest by the dominant user region while incorporating constitutional
359. Chappelle v. Grater Baton Rouge Airport District, 431 U.S. 159, 166–67 (1977).
360. Id.
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elected. In addition, H.B. 3189 retained the South Texas Advisory Council from S.B. 1477,
an appointed body that would advise the board on the interests of downstream users.
Representative Puente stated several times in the course of the committee hearing that
Loretta King from the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice had stated that the
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voting rights principles. This section attempts to explore the significance
of the board created by H.B. 3189.
Legislative Debate363
When the Texas legislature convened for its 1995 session, the failure
of the Edwards Aquifer Authority’s appointed board to obtain preclearance
had made the reconfiguration of the authority’s governance a high
legislative priority for both proponents and opponents of S.B. 1477. In the
House Natural Resources Committee, those who sought to create a board
that would pass Justice Department muster and enable the new Authority
to assume its duties sought to limit the debate to the issue of the board’s
configuration alone and in effect to argue legislative “issue preclusion”
with respect to the merits of the Authority itself. The legislature had
debated and agreed to the new Authority; the sole issue in the 1995 session
was the creation of an acceptable governing board.
Opponents of S.B. 1477, to the contrary, argued that the debate over
the board could not take place in a vacuum; the merits of the Edwards
Aquifer Authority itself remained at issue. This was especially true for
opponents of S.B. 1477 from the less-populated aquifer regions, or from
any rural region that relied on groundwater: now that the Department of
Justice and the federal district court had required that Texas meet Voting
Rights Act requirements, rural groundwater interests were even more at risk
than they had been with the 3-3-3 appointed board.364
On April 24, 1995, the House Committee on Natural Resources
considered the most promising of many alternatives proposed for amending
S.B. 1477’s governance provisions: House Bill 3189, authored and
sponsored by Representative Puente of San Antonio.365
Representative Puente of east and northeast San Antonio explained
that the first version of H.B. 3189 provided for a fifteen-member board
elected from single-member districts, with four board members from the
spring user region, seven board members from Bexar County, and four
board members from the irrigation user region. H.B. 3189 provided for one
person, one vote districts within each county and accounted for ethnicity in
drawing boundary lines to create districts from which minority candidates
could be elected; the districts also attempted to adhere to neighborhood
363. All references in this section are to House Natural Resources Committee
Debates [hereinafter H.B. 3189 Debates]. Audio tapes: Texas House, 74th Leg., R.S.: H.B.
3189 House Committee on Natural Resources Debate (Apr. 24, 1995) (on file with Texas
Legislative Reference Library); Texas House, 74th Leg., R.S., Open Floor Debate on
Second Reading of H.B. 3189, House Committee on Natural Resources Debate (May 9,
1995) (on file with Texas Legislative Reference Library).
364. H.B. 3189 Debates, supra note 363.
365. Id.
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boundaries. The bill called for the first elections to be held May 1996, with
interim board members serving until that time. In addition, H.B. 3189
retained the South Texas Advisory Council from S.B. 1477, an appointed
body that would advise the board on the interests of downstream users.
Representative Puente stated several times in the course of the committee
hearing that Loretta King from the Civil Rights Division of the Department
of Justice had stated that the Justice Department would not object to the 47-4 plan with the boundaries as drawn, and Judith Sanders-Castro of
LULAC had also stated that LULAC would not sue the state over such a
configuration.366
Representative Puente proceeded to explain the first proposed
amended version of H.B. 3189, which had not yet received informal Justice
Department approval. Under the first amended version of H.B. 3189, the
irrigation user and spring user regions each received five representatives,
creating a 5-7-5 structure. This structure was designed to increase fairness
for the less-populated user regions. This proposed amendment changed the
configuration of the districts within each county.367
Representative Lewis from Orange County in east Texas, who
cosponsored the bill, offered a second amended version under which the
spring user region would receive five representatives, Bexar County would
receive seven representatives, the irrigation user region would receive four
representatives, and downstream users would receive one representative
appointed by the South Texas Advisory Council. Representative Lewis
sought to convey to the legislature how the changes to the EAA board
would help or harm downstream water interests.368
Representative Corte from northwest San Antonio, an ally of San
Antonio developers and the Edwards Underground Water District,
introduced a committee substitute for H.B. 3189 with stiff opposition from
other committee members. Corte’s alternative exemplifies the way in
which S.B. 1477 opponents turned the debate over the EAA Board
configuration into a referendum on S.B. 1477 itself. Rep. Corte’s legislation
would have created an “interlocal agreement” whereby the EUWD, the
Medina Underground Water Conservation District, and the Uvalde
Underground Water Conservation District formed a “liaison committee.”369
Without explaining how this interlocal agreement would better
achieve the pumping limits necessary to guarantee Comal and San Marcos
Spring flows, Rep. Corte offered evidence from the Texas Water
Development Board, which he interpreted to mean that none of the
curtailments in aquifer use proposed for enactment by the EAA would
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reach the targets set by the USFWS to save the springs in a drought as
severe as the worst drought of record in the 1950s. Since Judge Bunton’s
order had required the state’s plan ensure spring safety even in the worst
drought of record, Rep. Corte appeared to suggest that the Edwards Aquifer
Authority should be abandoned in favor of a (less stringent) interlocal
authority. Representative Corte’s substitute was stalled in committee on
the question of its germaneness to consideration of H.B. 3189, since the
ostensible “committee substitute” went beyond the issue of the EAA
board’s configuration and sought to replace the EAA.
The committee testimony for and against H.B. 3189 revealed a great
deal about the alignment of aquifer-interested parties and the concerns that
each camp had in the event that the EAA finally came into existence. Mary
Arnold of the Texas League of Women Voters—which tends toward urban,
environmental, and voting-related concerns—confirmed that the districts
for the 4-7-4 board, as currently drawn, met Justice Department
requirements. Arnold described S.B. 1477 as a compromise and a step
forward and opposed the continued existence of the EUWD in the event
that H.B. 3189 passed. (The future of the EUWD was uncertain, since S.B.
1477 had abolished it, but then Texas had offered to keep the EUWD in
coexistence with the EAA in an unsuccessful attempt to secure Justice
Department approval of the EAA’s appointed board).370
Ms. DeHoyos, the chairperson of the EUWD who undermined the
state’s credibility in its negotiations with the Justice Department
concerning the possible coexistence of the EAA and the EUWD, also
testified. She said that the EUWD could have written a regional water plan
and controlled usage 20 years ago if the legislature had authorized it to do
so. Rep. Lewis, in a reproving tone, told DeHoyos that the legislature
expected cooperation from EUWD in the transition to the EAA, including
the transfer of 3.5 million dollars in funds to the new authority in the second
year of the EUWD’s budget cycle. DeHoyos asserted that the EUWD had
always been cooperative with the EAA plan.371
Also testifying in support of H.B. 3189 were representatives from the
City of San Antonio Water System and the San Antonio Chamber of
Commerce. Tristan Castaneda, from the chamber of commerce, supported
the 4-7-4 configuration because it had already received informal Justice
Department approval and would provide a sound management plan for the
state to pursue an Incidental Take Permit under the Endangered Species
Act. Cliff Morton, Chairman of the San Antonio Water System, purported
to testify in a neutral capacity but supported H.B. 3189. Morton pointed
out that San Antonio had supported the 3-3-3 appointed board and had
agreed to bear more than one-third of the EAA’s costs, even though San
370.
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Antonio clearly had more than one-third the users of the aquifer. The City
Council of San Antonio had passed a resolution supporting the elected
board proposed in H.B. 3189. The highest priority for San Antonio was the
prevention of two more years of litigation.372
Representative King, who opposed both S.B. 1477 and H.B. 3189,
pressed Morton concerning the possibility of the 5-7-5 board, and Morton
said he would personally support it. King then asked Morton why his
testimony concerning the 4-7-4 board mattered, since San Antonio would
apparently support any board configuration as long as the EAA became
effective.373
The spokespersons for Uvalde and Medina Counties’ irrigators
bitterly opposed the board configuration that H.B. 3189 would create.
Sterling Fly III, counsel for the Uvalde Underground Water District, stated
that any entity that regulated a natural resource should be evenly balanced
among user groups and that H.B. 3189 gave metropolitan interests more
weight. S.B. 1477 had been a “bitter pill,” but H.B. 3189 was even worse.
The proposed legislation diluted the voting rights of Uvalde County. For
Uvalde, passage of this law would be worse than simply allowing the
federal monitor’s plan to be enacted, even though that plan was so
restrictive as to be unenforceable.374
Luana Buckner, manager of the Medina County Underground Water
Conservation District, stated that the Edwards Aquifer Authority was a
special purpose district and should have been presented that way, affording
equal representation to each user group category. One example of a
problem she had with H.B. 3189: the way the lines were drawn under the
4-7-4 plan, Atascosa County received too much representation in relation
to the number of wells there. Representative Puente asked Buckner if her
district had not in fact opposed S.B. 1477, which was evenly divided among
user groups, and suggested that the issue for Medina County was not really
the board’s composition but the existence of the authority. Buckner tried
to backtrack and suggest that in comparison to H.B. 3189’s board, the 3-33 board of S.B. 1477 was better.
Kirk and Carol Patterson of San Antonio represented San Antonio
interests opposed to H.B. 3189, and in reality to S.B. 1477 as well. The
Pattersons supported the above-described interlocal authority proposed by
Rep. Corte. Kirk Patterson assumed the strategy of threatening to sue the
state for voting rights violations if H.B. 3189 passed, since the 4-7-4 board
did not conform to one person, one vote requirements. Patterson also took
the alternative and completely contradictory position that the 4-7-4 board
should not be weighted according to population at all, since the EAA was
372.
373.
374.
60

H.B. 3189 Debates, supra note 363.
Id.
Id.

Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1, Winter 2021

a special purpose district as contemplated by Ball v. James. Representative
Lewis responded that the legislature could not make decisions about the
aquifer based on who would sue because someone inevitably would do
so.375
Representative King, the most vocal opponent of H.B. 3189 on the
Natural Resources Committee, took the position that H.B. 3189 provided
no assurances that the state would solve either its Endangered Species Act
or its Voting Rights Act problems. With respect to the Voting Rights Act,
King asserted that none of the amended versions of H.B. 3189, whether the
5-7-5 or the 4-1-7-5 configurations, had received Justice Department
approval, and that the smaller counties would not accept the approved 4-74 plan. With respect to the Endangered Species Act, King cited the federal
water monitor Joe Morris, who had reviewed the proposed EAA plans and
had concluded that these plans would not preserve the Comal and San
Marcos springs in a drought matching the worst drought of record. Citing
the Texas Water Development Board statistics used by Rep. Corte, King
stated that even if all pumps were cut off in the five-county area during the
worst drought of record, the springs would still not be saved. (Rep. King’s
implication was that the state should pass nothing). Rep. Lewis responded
that such a drought was a once-in-a-century occurrence, and that the EAA
was needed to apply for an Incidental Take Permit under the Endangered
Species Act so that pumps would not have to be cut off during a drought.376
Among the several amendments to H.B. 3189 was language included
by Rep. King that the state does not own groundwater and that the EAA
shall not take property without compensation. The Natural Resources
Committee ultimately approved the 4-1-7-5 version of the EAA board in
H.B. 3189 proposed by Rep. Lewis. The vast majority of floor debate took
place upon the second reading of H.B. 3189 on May 9, 1995.
Representative Puente again urged that the issue at hand was not S.B. 1477,
which had already been passed, but the governance of the Authority. He
warned that a failure to pass the bill would cast a cloud over the San
Antonio economy; a city whose water supply was controlled by federal
authorities would face great economic problems. Failure to pass H.B. 3189
would also harm the agricultural counties.377
Representatives King and Hildebrand led the fight against passage of
H.B. 3189. King insisted that the change in the EAA’s board changed the
dynamics of the aquifer issue for the agricultural counties, since the original
3-3-3 structure had at least given the agricultural counties equal
representation. King repeated his argument from committee that the bill
would not satisfy Judge Bunton’s or the USFWS’s requirements for spring
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flow, and that the 4-1-7-5 board would not even satisfy Department of
Justice voting rights requirements.378
According to Representatives King and Lewis, S.B. 1477 and H.B.
3189 proposed to create a “huge, centralized, vast bureaucracy just to get a
Section 10(a) [Endangered Species Incidental Take] permit that’s never
been granted for an aquatic species.” King added that the Farm Bureau
rightly opposed this bill as a taking of private property rights. After a
certain date specified in S.B. 1477, no new wells could be drilled. This
would wipe out the rule of capture. A giant agency that decided whether
to give landowners permits represented a drastic change from the current
system. If this had been an emissions testing bill at the federal level, a
hearing would have been conducted. Here, farmers were underrepresented.
“You can’t make cake out of cow manure,” King concluded: “If you are for
property rights, you are against this bill.” King likened S.B. 1477 and H.B.
3189 to the golden-cheeked warbler controversy, driven by
environmentalists “hostile to property rights.”379
Representative Hildebrand added to King’s argument: he regretted his
failure to oppose S.B. 1477 last session, which had taken away property
rights from farmers when it “took away” the rule of capture. For example:
one hundred irrigators in Uvalde County were grandfathered in at two acrefeet per acre. Others who had not yet developed those water rights on their
land lost them. This was unfair. Hildebrand moved to table H.B. 3189,
which failed.380
Representatives Lewis and Puente responded to King’s and
Hildebrand’s attacks. Lewis protested that both King and Hildebrand were
attempting to use H.B. 3189 to resurrect their opposition to S.B. 1477 and
that the issue before the legislature was not whether to pass S.B. 1477 all
over again but whether to change its governance. Lewis insisted that the
aquifer was an issue of state, not regional, policy, and that a failure to pass
H.B. 3189 would result in an unprecedented takeover of an entire water
supply by the federal government. With respect to property rights, Puente
insisted that S.B. 1477 regulated private uses but did not take private
property rights. Puente disputed the notion that no new wells would be
drilled after a certain date if the EAA became effective. Rather, drilling
permits would be issued if water existed in the aquifer that could be drilled.
Representative Turner added with respect to property rights that there are
responsibilities that accompany such rights. “We have to learn to police
ourselves, or the Feds will take over our resources,” said Turner. Turner
added that the farmers were misled if they thought they would have a fair
voice in federal court and suggested that San Antonio would always prevail
378.
379.
380.
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once the problem became federal. Puente reminded the legislature of the
June 1995 hearing before Judge Bunton that would decide whether the
Recovery Plan devised by the federal monitor would be implemented.
Puente asserted that federal control would deter outside investors from
coming into the region and that the federal plan would hurt all three user
groups.381
The next issue that received attention in the H.B. 3189 floor debate
concerned the configuration of the EAA board in light of Voting Rights Act
requirements. Representative Conley, representing an African-American
district in east San Antonio, and Representative Longoria, representing a
Mexican-American district in west San Antonio, led the effort to amend
H.B. 3189 to reflect the original 4-7-4 configuration, rather than the 4-1-75 configuration that had come out of the Natural Resources Committee.
Representative Conley stated that she had voted against S.B. 1477 because
of its appointed board. Since that time, she had been in contact with Justice
Department officials charged with reviewing proposals from the state of
Texas to reconfigure the EAA board. Conley assured her colleagues based
on conversations with Justice Department officials that the 4-7-4, fifteenmember board would get preclearance. However, the new 4-1-7-5 board
would be refused because of the one appointed member from south Texas;
the Justice Department considered this elected-appointed mix
inappropriate. Other proposals, including a seventeen- or twenty-threemember board, were uncertain but less favored by Justice than the 4-7-4
plan. Conley and Longoria insisted that the 4-7-4 configuration already
deviated as far as they could allow from one person, one vote, since 90
percent of the aquifer’s users lived in Bexar County. Conley and Rodriguez
said they would help to instigate litigation under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act if the legislature passed a fifteen-, seventeen-, or twenty-threemember board weighting the smaller counties more heavily than the 4-7-4
plan.382
What the other legislators did not know was that the 4-7-4 plan really
did represent a compromise for minority representatives from Bexar
County: Representative Corte asserted that Judith Sanders-Castro of
LULAC had told him, Puente, and others that any plan giving less than 50
percent total representation to Bexar County would be unacceptable, and
that LULAC would move to block it. In reality, Representative Puente had
already negotiated with Bexar County’s minority interests to achieve the 47-4 plan, which representatives from irrigator counties in their floor debate
opposing H.B. 3189 floor debate were depicting as a kangaroo court for
Bexar County.383
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Representative Lewis said that he had also spoken with the Justice
Department, and no final decisions had been made regarding preclearance,
so the legislature should not make its decision based on some informal
statement from DOJ attorneys. Lewis stated that if he were from Bexar
County, he too would want to dominate the board, but that the 4-7-4 plan
was unfair for this very reason. The downstream users in Victoria and
Corpus Christi needed representation because they were so heavily affected
by aquifer use. Lewis said that someone would inevitably litigate under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, regardless of the board configuration
chosen. Representatives Longoria and Conley of San Antonio responded
that to whatever extent Bexar County would dominate under the 4-7-4 plan,
this was democracy: Bexar County had the vast majority of users. Longoria
asked, should a population of 1.5 million be dominated by a population less
than half that size? The issue was not one acre, one vote, but one person,
one vote, said Longoria. The fifteen-member board had already
compromised the principle of one person, one vote in favor of the irrigators
and spring users.384
On the third reading of H.B. 3189 on the floor of the legislature, the
4-7-4 plan passed and was adopted by the state senate. Texas Governor
Bush signed H.B. 3189 into law on May 31, 1995. On August 8, 1995, the
Department of Justice gave approval under Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act for the Temporary Directors of the Edwards Aquifer Authority to take
their oaths and to assume office on August 28, 1995.385
In 2018–2019, the EAA confirmed in Voting Rights Act litigation that
the 4-7-4 formula for its governing board embraced the logic of the special
purpose district exception as necessary to protect the interests of the three
user groups.
The 17-member board includes 15 voting members representing
districts: seven in Bexar County, one in Comal County, one representing
parts of both Comal and Guadalupe counties, one in Hays County, one
representing parts of Hays and Caldwell counties, one in Medina County,
one representing parts of Medina and Atascosa counties, and two in Uvalde
County.386
The districts do not reflect population distribution but are the result of
what advocates of the system say are a compromise among urban and rural
people who all depend on the same water source.387
“‘The Court’s decision solidifies the carefully constructed balance
struck amongst regional stakeholders when the EAA was created and will
allow the EAA to continue to provide the highest level of services to all
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users of the Aquifer in a fair and equitable manner,’ said Luana Buckner,
chair of the authority’s board of directors.”388
Luana Buckner, from the irrigation user Segment of the EAA, an
erstwhile enemy of the 4-7-4 EAA board created by H.B. 3189, has now
become a staunch defender of the 4-7-4 configuration when faced with the
prospect of enfranchising more Bexar County voters.389
Groundwater Governance Post-Shelby
Given that the protracted negotiation and legislation concerning the
EAA Board happened because Section 5 preclearance under the Voting
Rights Act resulted in the Justice Department’s rejection of the ninemember appointed board originally provided for in S.B. 1477, the question
arises whether the Voting Rights Act will continue to play a critical role in
the formation of groundwater districts after Shelby County v. Holder.390
Shelby did not declare Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
unconstitutional. However, the decision invalidated Section 4(b), which
provided the coverage formula to determine which states were subject to
the Preclearance Process.391 Unless Congress amends Section 4(b) of the
Act to the Court’s satisfaction, Section 5 preclearance is moribund. For
cases that challenge the revision of boards that govern special purpose
districts like aquifers, the elimination of preclearance raises serious
questions.
Absent preclearance, state and local officials who work to formulate
governing boards for common pool resources may be more likely to use the
special purpose district exception to deviate from one person, one vote. The
possibility will no longer exist that the Department of Justice will invalidate
ex ante the composition of a board created to govern a common pool
resource.
Courts have applied the special purpose district exception to Voting
Rights Act disputes in a number of contexts.392 One recurring fact pattern
looks like this: the court concludes that a local government with an elected
board and limited powers to regulate a sole resource on which two different
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populations rely, the one large and the other small, can deviate from one
person, one vote and give the smaller population more voting power than
the larger one in order to avoid a “disproportionate impact” on the smaller
group. If this exception is constitutionally valid and makes it easier for user
groups of a common pool resource to escape Hobbesian rules of use and
adopt new rules of use to sustain a resource, then one might predict a
positive result in the aftermath of Shelby: perhaps the absence of Section 5
preclearance could eliminate scrutiny that impedes the transition to
sustainable rules of use.
Unfortunately, the (predominantly southern) states formerly subject to
preclearance have often exhibited a tendency toward restricting the
franchise for ethnic and racial minorities: “‘Since Shelby, states have really
opened the floodgates to voter suppression, and we’ve seen laws that have
discriminated against voters of color all across the country,’ commented
Leigh Chapman, the director of the voting rights program at the Leadership
Conference on Civil and Human Rights.”393 Texas has proven no exception
to this post-Shelby trend, as protracted litigation to enact the nation’s
strictest voter ID law that would have removed approximately 600,000
minority voters from the rolls in response to statistically insignificant
evidence of voter fraud reflects.394 This suggests that the special purpose
district exception applied to common pool resources may become a
mechanism for depriving citizens of the vote even where their inclusion
would not jeopardize the balance among user groups necessary to make
new rules work.
Viewed in this light, the voting claims that the League of United Latin
American Citizens (LULAC) recently brought against the Edwards Aquifer
Authority—albeit unsuccessfully—assume special importance.395 LULAC
brought two claims that challenged the apportionment plan for the singlemember districts used to elect directors to the EAA.396 The first claim under
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; the second
claim arose under 42 U.S.C. Section 1973, Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, for alleged dilution of minority votes.397 The San Antonio Water
System (SAWS) brought a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the
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Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (the one person,
one vote claim).398
In the aftermath of Shelby, voting rights claims brought under the
Equal Protection Clause and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act may well
serve as ad hoc substitutes for preclearance under Section 5. Much depends
on whether the courts will choose to apply the special purpose district
exception where the facts do not warrant it: where close analysis reveals
that the governance of a common pool resource does not really face the
dilemmas that make it necessary to deviate from one person, one vote.
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